UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO LTD Vs. CHANDRAMMA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE short point that is involved in this appeal but a point of considerable importance is a question as to whether the appellant insurance company can be held liable for the claim that has been preferred on behalf of a deceased police constable. The incident in question took place at about 2. 45 a. m. in the early hours of 15. 9. 1985. The lorry No. MED 4692 was approaching nelamangala Town and two police constables boarded that lorry. Some time later, there was a violent collision between this truck and another stationary truck parked on the highway without any lights. As a result of this collision, both the police constables died and two claims were preferred. We are not concerned with the other claim except to a very limited extent in so far as the Tribunal did award an amount of Rs. 60. 000 in that case as compensation and the respondents' learned advocate submitted that the insurance company has not appealed against that award. The appellant's learned advocate states that he is not aware as to whether this position is correct and that he, therefore, does not accept that statement. To my mind, it does not make much difference because even though the respondents' learned advocate vehemently submitted that if the insurance company has accepted the liability in respect of the other police constable who died in the same incident then it would be estopped from disputing the liability in this case; that position is not altogether correct because the two cases were heard separately and the findings are also dissimilar but on the question of liability, there is some justification in the argument that the insurance company cannot be permitted to adopt different standards in respect of similarly situated persons, particularly when the deaths occurred in the same incident. That, however, is not the end of the matter.

(2.) THE appellant's learned advocate submitted that the law on the point has now been settled by the Full Bench judgment of this Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Dundamma 1992 ACJ1 , [1992 ]75 Compcas141 (Kar ), ILR1991 KAR 2045 , 1991 (3 )Karlj505 , wherein the Full Bench has categorically held that the liability of the insurance company cannot be invoked in those cases where a passenger is found travelling in a goods vehicle. He, therefore, submitted that the deceased had boarded a goods vehicle and howsoever unfortunate it may be, the insurance company cannot be held liable because the deceased was a passenger in a goods vehicle. The respondents' learned advocate has disputed this position on facts because he submits that even the Full Bench judgment has made certain exceptions such as the case of an owner who is accompanying the goods carried in the vehicle and he submits that the bar is not absolute. In the present case what he points out is not that the deceased was not a lay person but that he was a member of the police force and that this would make some difference. He has taken me through the record and demonstrated that the deceased was in uniform, that he even had the lathi which the police normally carry with them when they are on duty and that there is no dispute about the fact that the deceased was not on a private visit but that he was stationed at that particular place on duty. On the basis of this document the learned advocate submits that the court ought not to hold that he was a mere passenger in the vehicle and if this is the position, then the order of the Tribunal awarding compensation must be upheld. I do concede that the law on the point is quite conclusive and that the appellant's learned advocate is right when he points out that a passenger in a goods vehicle would be disqualified from claiming compensation. The present case is a very very unusual one insofar as it has been demonstrated that the deceased was in uniform and that he was on duty at that time. There is some suggestion to the effect that his duty had just got over and that the reason why he boarded the vehicle was because he was making his way home after finishing his duty. This evidence is not, however, conclusive insofar as the deceased was not available to indicate the reasons why he boarded the vehicle and we do not have any other positive evidence to disprove the fact that he could have boarded the vehicle for a specific purpose. I am conscious of the fact that it may be a question of propounding a reasonable hypothecation but the court needs to take into consideration the possibility that there could have been several very plausible reasons why the deceased boarded the vehicle in question. The more important of them being that it might have been in connection with an enquiry or investigation or it could have also been if for any reason the deceased felt that the vehicle should be taken to the closest police station. This is virtually a grey area insofar as there is no conclusive evidence on record to indicate definitely as to why the deceased was travelling in the vehicle in question. Though there is an equal possibility that he was a mere passenger, there is a greater probability that he was not and having regard to the state of the record and the fact that the deceased had been on duty and was in uniform, I would prefer to accept the latter position. If that be the case, then the deceased had every reason to be travelling in the vehicle as a member of the law enforcement machinery and if the accident has taken place, he would certainly be entitled to compensation because he would not come within the excluded category. This being the position, I see no reason for this Court to interfere with the award that has been made by the Tribunal. The award is accordingly confirmed though for different reasons. The appellant is directed to deposit the balance amount with the Tribunal within an outer limit of twelve weeks from today.

(3.) THE Tribunal has indicated in the award that the respondent No. 1, wife will be entitled to receive two of the amounts exclusively. These two amounts along with the interest shall be paid over to the respondent No. 1, wife. The balance of the amount shall be invested under four separate heads. The amount shall be divided equally into four parts, the first of them being invested as a fixed deposit for a period of five years renewable every five years for five such periods in the name of the respondent No. 1, wife, with instructions to the bank to pay the interest to the respondent No. 1 and on the expiry of the said period to repay to her the principal without any further court orders. The Tribunal shall ensure that the investment is done in a nationalised or commercial bank situated reasonably close to the place where the respondent No. 1 is residing. As far as the balance three amounts are concerned, they shall be similarly invested in the joint names of each of the minor children and the mother for a similar period renewable until 5 years after the minor in question has attained majority. The interest shall be payable quarterly to the mother for the benefit of the children and it is directed that in respect of payment of interest and the repayment of principal that the bank be informed that no further court orders will be necessary and that on the expiry of the period in question the repayment shall automatically be made.