KRISHNA GOWDA Vs. SHEIK SULEMAN SAB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This matter arises out of an application for registration of occupancy in respect of agricultural lands situate in Yeladehalli village under S.45 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, hereinafter called 'the Act'. The said application was made by the first respondent Sheik Suleman Sab. The Tribunal, by its order in Case No.LRF 47 of 1974-75 made on 21-8-1975 confirmed the right of occupancy of Sheik Suleman in respect of Survey No. 16 measuring 3 acres, 7 guntas of dry land. Some time thereafter, an application was made before the Tribunal by the appellant Krishna Gowda to review the Tribunal's order dt.21-8-75. On that application the Tribunal did not make any final order; but on 2-1-1976, it made an order expressing the view that it had decided the case in ' favour of Sheik Suleman on 21-8-75, that the purchaser of the land, viz, Krishna Gowda (appellant) had filed his objections after the decision and that therefore, the Tribunal was of the unanimous opinion that it was necessary to reconsider the issue. A penalty of Rs.100 was levied and restoration was ordered. The said order dt.2-1-76 was challenged before this Court by Sheik Suleman Sab (respondent-1 herein) in WP.9994 of 1976.

(2.) The ground urged by the first respondent Sheik Suleman Sab was that the Tribunal had ceased to have jurisdiction after the disposal of the matter by its order dt.21-8-75 and the entire subsequent proceedings before the Tribunal inclusive of the order dt.2-1-76 were without jurisdiction and therefore, null and void. It is relevant to state that the appellant Krishna Gowda was respondent-3 in WP.9994 of 1976 and he had entered appearance through his Lawyer Sri S.Siddappa. Since the Cause List issued by this Court did not show his name, he did not attend the Court on the date of hearing and the case proceeded in his absence. The learned Single Judge accepted the ground urged by Sheik Suleman and held that the Tribunal, when it passed its order on 2-1-76 on the Review Application, had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter. So far as the 3rd respondent Krishna Gowda was concerned, the learned Single Judge stated that if he was aggrieved by the first order, viz, order dt 21-8-75, it was open to him to challenge the same before this Court. The learned Single Judge further observed that even before this Court, the 3rd respondent Krishna Gowda had remained absent, though he was served. In that view, the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition and quashed the order No.LRF 47 of 1974-75 dt.21-8-75. It is against this order that the above writ appeal has been preferred. The only grievance made by the learned Counsel for the appellant before this Court is that the order should have been made after hearing him; that as the cause list issued by this Court did not show his name, he could not be present in Court and that if he had been heard, the learned Single Judge could have been persuaded to come to a contrary conclusion. In substance, his argument was that the order 'made by the learned Single Judge (Bhimiah, J) violates the Rules of Natural Justice and therefore, is liable to be set aside.

(3.) However attractive the argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant appears to be, this appeal is devoid of merit. Art.226(1) of the Constitution as amended by the 42nd Amendment has made substantial changes with regard to the scope of writ petitions under Art.226. Under the said Article as it now stands, the High Court has power to issue any writ or direction only for the enforcement of any rights conferred by the provisions of Part III; or for the redress of any injury of a substantial nature by reason of the contravention of any other provisions of the Constitution or any provision of any enactment or Ordinance or any order, rule, regulation bye-law, or other instrument made thereunder; or for the redress of any injury by reason of any illegality in any proceedings by or before any authority under any provision referred to in sub-clause (b) where such illegality has resulted in substantial failure of justice. It will thus be seen that for obtaining redress of any injury caused by reason of any illegality in any proceedings by or before any authority, such illegality should have resulted in substantial failure of justice.