(1.) The question involved in these two petitions is the same, viz., whether or not instances of a corrupt practice, which were not in the original petition, can be allowed to be filed after the time for filing an election petition has expired. There is hardly any dispute on questions of fact. The dispute centres round the construction of Section 90, Sub-section (5) of the Representation of the People Act as it stands after amendment in 1956.
(2.) The petitioners in both these petitions had filed their respective election petitions for setting aside the elections in which they respectively stood as candidates. The petitioners in their respective petitions referred to various corrupt practices which the respondents are said to have committed and for which the elections were sought to be avoided and gave several instances in each ease of such corrupt practices. Thereafter they made the applications which have given rise to the present petitions for allowing them to give further Instances of such corrupt practices. The said petitions were opposed by the respondents in each case but were allowed by the Tribunal. Hence the present petitions have been filed to this court for appropriate writs quashing the said order of the Tribunal dated 2-9-1257.
(3.) The principal contention raised by Mr. Rajah Iyer in support of both these petitions was-that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to allow such instances to be furnished beyond the period of time mentioned in the Act for filing the election petition. I should mention that it is not disputed before us that these applications were filed beyond such time. Mr. Rajah Iyer further contended before us-that Section 90 (5) of the Representation of the People (Amendment) Act, 1956, under which the Tribunal purported to make the said order, only permits the Tribunal to allow particulars of any-corrupt practice which have already been given-to be amended or amplified and does not permit fresh instances of such corrupt practice to be filed.