KEMPEGOWDA Vs. NATIONAL HIGHWAY AUTHORITY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THOUGH these appeals are listed for admission, the contesting respondents are served and represented by their learned counsel. Further the only question which requires to be considered is as to whether the arbitration suit filed before the trial Court was barred by time or not and if it is not so, the entire proceedings is to be redone by the Court below, and as such admitting the appeal arising out of the preliminary point and keeping it pending is not desirable. Considering these aspects of the matter, these appeals are taken up for final disposal with the consent of the learned Counsel and disposed of by this order.

(2.) THE Court below had clubbed all the suits, viz. , A. S. Nos. 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73 and 74/2004 from which the present appeals arise and a common order has been passed. Accordingly, all these appeals are against the common order. As such all these appeals are clubbed together and disposed of by this common order.

(3.) THE different extents of land belonging to the appellants were acquired for the benefit of the first respondent/national Highway authority. The relevant notification thereto and the further proceedings up to culminating in the passing of award are not in dispute and as such I do not find it necessary to advert to the said details. The only issue which arises for consideration is that subsequent to the award passed by the Arbitrator determining the compensation amount and considering that it was an award passed by an Arbitrator as contemplated under the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation act, 1996, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') whether the appellants in the present cases have preferred the arbitration suits assailing the award passed by the arbitrator within the period of limitation prescribed under the Act. The fact that the award in question was passed on 21. 2. 2003 is not in dispute. The appellants however had only been notified of the passing of the award and compensation awarded thereunder had been paid to them on 27. 10. 2003 and no copy of the award was despatched to the appellants is also not in dispute. The question is subsequent to such award and keeping in view the point of time when a copy of the award was received by the appellants herein, whether the arbitration suit could have been maintained since Section 34 (3) of the Act mandates that any challenge to the award should be made within a period of three months and a further period of 30 days thereafter, and in any event not beyond the period of 120 days. Though decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court and other Courts have been relied upon on this aspect of the matter, I do not find it necessary to refer to the same since it is not in dispute nor is it argued by the appellants that the appeal can be preferred beyond the period of 120 days.