(1.) Petitioner is one among the eight defendants in Original Appeal No. 36 of 1996 on the file of the Debt Recovery Tribunal (9th respondent), filed by the first respondent, in January 1996. After issuing notice to the defendants and granting opportunity to the defendants to file objections, the Tribunal, by order dated 24-6-1996, set down the case for evidence on 22-7-1996. On that day, the Bank examined three witnesses. Defendants 1 and 5 to 8 were absent. On behalf of defendants 2 to 4, time was sought for cross-examination. It was refused and the case is posted to 14-8-1996 for defendants evidence. According to petitioner (3rd defendant in the suit), when a request for an adjournment was made, the Tribunal ought to have adjourned the matter, as the case was coming up for evidence for the first time, or at least passed over the matter and kept it by for being taken up later in the day; and the refusal by the Tribunal to grant an adjournment, is in negation of the basic principles of natural justice. It is contended that unless sufficient accommodation is granted when adjournment are sought by a defendant, grant of hearing becomes an empty formality. Hence, petitioner has filed this petition for (a) a declaration that the order dated 22-7-1996 passed by the Tribunal refusing the request for grant of time for cross-examination of A.Ws. 1 to 3, is illegal and to quash the same; and (b) a direction to the Tribunal to permit the petitioner to cross-examine the said witnesses.
(2.) The Act provides for a remedy by way of appeal, if a person is aggrieved by an order made, or deemed to have been made by the Tribunal, under the Act. A writ petition, under Articles 226 and 227 will not be entertained in regard to interlocutory orders made by the Tribunal, unless it is shown that such order has resulted in a grave miscarriage of justice, either as a result of violation of any statutory provision or an account of bias or mala fides or arbitrariness, or violation of principles of justice.
(3.) Petitioner's contention is that when a case comes up for cross-examination of witnesses, for the first time, if a request for an adjournment is made, principles of natural justice require grant of time even though no ground may be made out for an adjournment. Acceptance of such a proposition would amount to extending the principles of natural justice beyond the reasonable limits. Section 22 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 ('Act' for short) provides that the Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, but shall be guided by the principles of natural justice, and, subject to the other provisions of the Act and the rules, shall have the power to regulate its own procedure. Principles of natural justice in matters that are brought before the Tribunal, may require issue of a notice and grant of reasonable opportunity to (a) file objections and to let in evidence, both oral and documentary; (b) to cross-examine the witnesses of the other party; and (c) to submit arguments, either written or oral. But, grant of adjournment merely for the asking, to cross-examine the witnesses, in the absence of valid reasons for adjournment, is not a part of principles of natural justice. The Tribunals under the Act have been constituted to ensure expeditious adjudication and recovery of debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions. The first respondent's application has been pending before the Tribunal, for more than six months. Unless the defendants make out a reasonable ground to seek an adjournment, they are not entitled to an adjournment, merely because the matter had come up for evidence for the first time or because the defendants did not find it convenient to proceed with the matter or because the defendants or their Counsels were not ready to proceed with the matter; and in such circumstances refusal by the Tribunal to grant an adjournment would not amount to violation of principles of natural justice. Litigants may be accustomed to routinely seeking and obtaining adjournments in Civil Courts, which itself is a matter to be deprecated. But the same cannot be made a convention or custom or a right, in a recovery proceedings before the Tribunal. It adjournments are to be routinely granted by the Tribunal, and the cases are to be kept pending for several years, the very purpose of establishing such exclusive Tribunals will be defeated and the Act will be rendered nugatory.