MANJULAKUDLIGI Vs. S V PATIL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE learned State Public Prosecutor is requested to take notice in this matter.

(2.) THE petitioner in this case, appears in person. According to her, in the course of some litigation, an appeal was filed by her before the then III Additional District Judge, Belgaum, Mr. Arali nagaraj, which appeal came to be dismissed. The petitioner contends that she was aggrieved by this order and therefore, she filed a suit against the Judge claiming damages from him. The plaint came to be rejected after which, an identical plaint was presented for the second time which was also rejected and the petitioner followed this up by filing a third suit which also came to be rejected. The petitioner thereafter did not stop in her efforts, but went to the Criminal Court and filed a private complaint under Section 219, I. P. C. against the learned Judge who had rejected the plaints. On this complaint, Sri S. V. Patil, the then Principal C. J. and C. J. M. , Belgaum, passed an order dated 14-9-1995 which is a speaking order and which is the subject matter of the present petition. The learned Judge has, in the order in question, recorded the finding that no criminal proceeding is maintainable in law against the learned Judge who had rejected the plaints irrespective of what the facts or the grievances may be and under these circumstances, he has dismissed the matter itself outright. The petitioner has now presented the present petition alleging that the learned Judge sri S. V. Patil is guilty of criminal contempt in so far as according to her, the learned Judge did not take down the verification statement of the complainant and the learned Judge also did not afford her an opportunity of producing further evidence and material. According to her, the dismissal in question constitutes interference with the course of a judicial proceeding and is, therefore, actionable under the Contempts of Courts Act.

(3.) THE office has raised a series of objections most of which are procedural, but has also pointed out that as far as an allegation of criminal contempt is concerned, that the sanction of the Advocate General is essential. The petitioner has contended that this is not so. The scheme of the Contempt of Courts Act is very clear as far as criminal contempt is concerned, in so far as no private party has a right in the first instance to institute or initiate criminal contempt proceedings before the High Court. The learned Advocate General is a sufficiently senior and highly designated member of the bar and by virtue of the office which he holds, he is invested with the power of scrutinising applications and complaints and according sanction in appropriate cases and refusing sanction in cases that do not qualify for sanction. It is true that over a period of time, even in cases where the learned Advocate General may have refused sanction, if the petitioner-applicant is able to satisfy the Court that sufficient ground exists for the Court of its own motion to take cognizance of an act of criminal contempt, that in a few exceptional cases, the Court will examine the grievance and perhaps either take cognizance or refuse to do so. This does not under any circumstances mean that the requirement of applying in the first instance to the learned Advocate General can be by-passed. The petitioner before us has contended that such an application is unnecessary. This is not the scheme of the law and under these circumstances, in so far as the application which ought to have been made to the learned Advocate General for sanction has not been made, this petition itself is not maintainable.