AMARAPPA Vs. ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) PROCEEDINGS under the Land Acquisition Act have from time to time thrown up different facets of the law, most of these having been occasioned by the negligence displayed on the part of the land acquisition authorities. This is one more of such cases and the Courts have consistently culled out the principle that a citizen's right to receive fair compensation can neither be defeated nor extinguished due to the negligence/misconduct that may be attributable to the department. The Courts have proceeded on the footing that a citizen cannot be punished for the misdemeanour of the Opposite party and in doing so, the Courts have never lost sight of the principle that invariably the claimant happens to be a rural fanner who belongs to the weaker section who is invariably illiterate and ill-equipped to even agitate for his rights. The law has not made allowances, but has very clearly and consistently upheld the well-settled canon of jurisprudence, that the concept of doing justice requires that the end result of the process will not be frustrated due to factors for which the claimant or the citizen cannot be held responsible. Conversely, I need to point out that the State and its officers cannot be conferred with an unfair benefit or unjust enrichment that may result due to a set of circumstances for which nobody other than the State and its officers are responsible.

(2.) THE controversy that has arisen in the present C. R. P. may briefly be summarised insofar as the question has arisen as to whether, in a case where the application under Section 18 (1) for making a reference to the Court has been filed in time and the Deputy Commissioner does not act on that application for years together, the right to have the reference adjudicated by the Civil Court can be said to have been extinguished within the normal period of limitation. The Division Bench of this Court after considering the law in considerable detail, laid down in the decision reported in ILR 1991 Karnataka 1899 that where the application has not been filed within the period prescribed under Section 18 (1)with the Land Acquisition Officer and within the three-year period prescribed under Section 18 (3) (b), that, on the expiry of the aggregate period of 3 years and 90 days, the right to claim a reference to the Court stands extinguished. That decision was on an entirely different set of facts where fraudulent applications were made after the lapse of 14 years and the Land Acquisition Officer made a reference to the Court and the Division Bench had occassion to come down heavily on such virtually fraudulent applications and to lay down that the right stood extinguished on the expiry of the prescribed period. This is a case where there is no such fraud involved and a case in which the application has been made within the prescribed period of time, but where the Land Acquisition Officer has slept over the matter in a deep slumber that lasted for 25 years. The Division Bench judgment is, therefore, distinguishable and will not bind the petitioner in the present case. The notice in the present proceeding under Section 12 (2)of the Act was issued to the claimant on 24. 11. 1966. He filed an application under section 18 (1) asking for a reference within the prescribed period i. e. on 20. 1. 1967. The authorities did nothing in the matter and after a long wait, on 23. 4. 1984, the claimant filed an application under Section 18 (3) (b) before the Court and on this application, the Court directed the Land Acquisition Officer to make a reference. This order was passed by the court on 27. 10. 1984 and it is very significant to record that despite such an order from the court to which there was no objection from the State, the reference was made only on 24. 7. 1992 which is after a lapse of another 8 years. This case is illustrative of the levels of criminal misconduct that is prevalent on the part of this department of the State Government where, the Division Bench of this Court had occasion to come down on several dishonest and fraudulent malpractices in relation to land acquisition proceedings and where even Court orders take 8 years for implementation. It is virtually in this background, that one needs to approach the further developments in the case whereby the State raised the objection that the reference which was made in the year 1992 was not a valid one insofar as it was filed well beyond the period prescribed by the Section. Whereas the law recognise a principle that a party cannot take advantage of its own wrong, this was a classic instance where the reference that should have been made in the year 1967 and which finally reached the Court in the year 1992 is objected to by the very defaulting, party, namely the department. The trial Court misapplied the ratio of the Division Bench ruling referred to by me earlier and held that the right to have the reference adjudicated by the Civil Court is time-barred and also upheld the objection canvassed on behalf of the State that the order passed on 27. 10. 1984 is an invalid order because, that order itself was timebarred insofar as the applicant ought to have approached the Court under Section 18 (3) (b)within the period of 3 years and 90 days and, consequently, the lower Court dismissed the reference. This C. R. P. is directed against that order.

(3.) BY way of a preliminary objection, Mr. Goulay has virtually anticipated the case pleaded by the learned Government Advocate namely that the lower Court itself was not competent to entertain the application to pass an order under Section 18 (3} (b) on 27. 10. 1984 in respect of a 12 (2) notice issued to the claimant on 24. 11. 1966. Mr. Goulay has raised a twofold submission, the first being that it is not competent for the lower Court to question the validity or correctness of the order dated 27. 10. 1984 which has become final. Learned counsel drew my attention to two decisions of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1964 SC 907 and AIR 1966 SC 106p, wherein the supreme Court has held that if it is demonstrated that the impugned order was passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction, then it is not possible to question that decision on any grounds of legality unless the order in question was taken in appeal or revision and rectified. The Supreme Court has virtually applied the rule of finality to such orders and for good reason, insofar as there is no sanction or licence to a party to question the validity of an order or a decree after the period of limitation has expired by going behind that order and seeking to point out infirmities in it. As long as the order was passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction, the order is beyond question. In a subsequent decision reported in air 1977 SC 392*, the Supreme Court had occasion to reiterate this principle by further laying down that irrespective of what the grounds of challenge to such an order are, if it has become final, that the bar of res judicata would apply in respect of such an order at a subsequent point of time. On this basis, mr. Goulay submitted that the order passed in 1984 directing the filing of a reference cannot be reviewed and that too, by the same Court.