M SHANKARAPPA Vs. INDERCHAND BAFNA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioner's learned Advocate submits that the trial court ought not to have decreed the suit on 22-9-1992 without granting permission to the present petitioner who was the defendant to file the written statement. The learned Advocate has relied on a copy of the Order sheet which indicates that the suit came up for hearing on 24-8-1992. This was a suit on a pronote and in the absence of any valid cogent defence, the court would have no option except to pass a decree straightaway. The learned Advocate for the defendant filed his vakalath and asked for time. The time was granted up to 19-9-1992. On that date, the court has recorded that the written statement was not filed despite sufficient time having been given from 24-8-1992. The court, therefore, proceeded on the assumption that no defence has been pleaded and fixed the matter for disposal on 22-9-1992. On that date, the court decreed the suit.

(2.) THE petitioner's learned Advocate submits that his client is a resident in k. g. f. in kolar and that he had written to his client, but there was no response as a result of which, he was unable to file the written statement. He submits that this was not an old matter and that time had been granted on only one occasion and that therefore, the learned trial judge was in error in having refused to grant some more time in this case. The second submission canvassed by the learned Advocate is that the promissory note has been executed at kolar and that the office itself had raised the objection with regard to the want of jurisdiction on the part of the bangalore court which point was kept open and he submits that irrespective of any other considerations, that the bangalore court clearly could not have exercised jurisdiction and that therefore, the decree passed cannot be sustained. As far as the second submission is concerned, I need to point out that the bar of jurisdiction is a legal objection and nothing prevented the defendant's learned Advocate from arguing this point before the trial court even if the written statement had not formally been placed on record. Nothing of this sort had been done and it is in this background that I am unable to uphold the contention that is now advanced that the court was obliged to grant any further time. There is no inherent right on the part of any party to a litigation to delay or dialate the proceedings nor is it to be assumed that it is only after several dates of hearing have elapsed or after the proceeding has grown sufficiently old, that it can be heard on merits. These wrong conventions have now to be discarded as this is the prime ground on which the arrears in courts have built up and the courts are virtually getting unnecessarily choked up. Expediency is absolutely essential and particularly in cases of the present type, the law itself provides for a decree to be passed if a defence has not been placed on record or pleaded. It is in this background that there is little justification for any interference with the order.

(3.) THE only limited aspect of the matter that I am wiffing to consider is with regard to the plea raised by the petitioner's learned Advocate regarding the basic question as to whether the trial court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit or not. This objection had been raised by the office and had not been decided in favour of the plaintiff. The learned trial judge has not addressed himself to that aspect of the matter and has proceeded on the footing that the court does in fact have jurisdiction. In the absence of that point being decided, the passing of a decree cannot be justified. I agree that the basic duty of agitating this aspect of the case rested on the defence, but even if the defence had not proceeded to put forward any submissions in this regard, the learned trial judge should have asked the plaintiff to satisfy the court with regard to the jurisdiction angle. It is from this limited point of view alone, that interference with the Order is necessary. However, I do not propose to allow the present petitioner who is the defendant to the suit to get away with what has in fact happened before the trial court. Appropriate directions in this regard are accordingly being issued.