(1.) This case has a chequered history behind it; spreading over a period of two decades or so. By reason of the sheer length of the years that the parties have spent fighting over what can hardly be said to be a fabulous piece of property measuring 10' x 20' one would have very much liked to give a quietus to the controversy if only the same was possible within judicially manageable dimensions. Pious hopes and noble intentions notwithstanding, the solution does not seem to be anywhere in view for what is under challenge in this petition is not a final order but one remanding the case back for a further enquiry, thereby ensuring yet another round of appeals revisions and eventually writ petitions in this Court.
(2.) It is unnecessary to set out in detail the various stages through which this litigation has passed over the years. The impugned order passed by the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal at Bangalore sufficiently serves that purpose. Suffice it to say that the small piece of land which constitutes the proverbial bone of contention between the parties is situate on the Indi-Bijapur Road within the town limits of Indi. The petitioner who claims to be an unemployed graduate and the 4th respondent were rival claimants for the site in question both having applied for the same on lease basis to the authorities concerned. While the application made by the 4th respondent was rejected on the ground that any grant in his favour would offend the Ribbon Development Rules the petitioner showed greater perseverance and succeeded in getting orders granting short terms leases in his favour from time to time. These orders were successfully challenged by the 4th respondent who preferred appeals against the same before the Deputy Commissioner, the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal and eventually in this Court in Writ Petition No. 17184 of 1981. The pendency of the writ petition, notwithstanding the authorities were given the liberty to consider the question of renewal of the lease in favour of the petitioner which was granted from time to time till 18th of September, 1991 when the Deputy Commissioner, Bijapur in an Appeal filed against one of such grants observed that there was no objection to the grant of the land in favour of the petitioner on a permanent basis. Consequently, the Assistant Commissioner, Indi, by an order made by him in that behalf permanently granted the site in question in favour of the petitioner. This order also came under challenge at the instance of the 4th respondent before the Tribunal who remanded the matter back to the Deputy Commissioner, Bijapur with a direction to hold a fresh enquiry. The later made a spot inspection and confirmed the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner. Against the said order the 4th respondent once again preferred an appeal before the Tribunal which has by order dated 4-5-1993, been allowed resulting in the orders made in favour of the petitioner being set aside and the matter being remanded back to the Assistant Commissioner, Indi, for fresh disposal in accordance with law. It is this remand order that has been brought under challenge in the present writ petition.
(3.) Mr. Goulay, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner found fault with the Tribunal's order primarily on two distinct counts. His foremost submission was that the 4th respondent had no locus standi to have filed the appeal before the Tribunal inasmuch as his own application for grant of the site in question had been rejected years ago whereafter he had not agitated the matter any further. It was argued that even the alternative case set up by the 4th respondent before the Tribunal that the grant in question had the effect of depriving the 4th respondent of the access to his property had been turned down with the result that the 4th respondent had no real or genuine, grievance against the same so as to give him the locus to maintain an appeal. The question as to whether the grant would have the effect of violating the provisions of the Ribbon Development Rules, it was contended, could not have been raised by the 4th respondent who was unconcerned with the property especially in the light findings returned by the Tribunal. Any such possible violation was, according to Mr. Goulay, a matter only between the petitioner and the authorities concerned. Alternatively, it was urged that the question as to whether the grant violated the Ribbon Development Rules had been answered in favour of the petitioner by the Tribunal while disposing of an earlier appeal filed by the 4th respondent by its order dated 16th March, 1981, where it was held that the proposed construction to be raised by the petitioner would not offend the provisions of the aforesaid Rules. A remand made by the Tribunal for a fresh finding on the said question was according to Mr. Goulay wholly unnecessary and unsustainable in law.