(1.) The short point involved in this civil revision petition is with regard to whether the appeal Court was justified in having granted an ad interim injunction against the petitioners who were the original defendants before the Trial Court. The original suit pertains to a dispute concerning agricultural lands and the petitioners' learned Advocate has invoked the provisions of Section 4 of the Karnataka Land Reforms (Second Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1974 (31 of 1974) which reads as follows :
(2.) The petitioners' learned Advocate submitted that the respondent obtained an ad interim order from the Trial Court which was passed without notice to his clients and that despite an application being made to the Trial Court for vacating that order, that it took as many as one full year before the Court heard the parties and passed orders and vacated the interim order. Learned Advocate submits, that the legislature has advisedly incorporated this provision for purposes of safeguarding the interest of persons who are in possession of agricultural land and that it is mandatory for notice to be issued before orders are passed. Learned Advocate submitted that effectively, this provision takes away the jurisdiction of Courts to pass ex parte orders in such cases and he demonstrates that despite a detailed speaking order passed by the Trial Court vacating the original injunction order against his clients, that they have filed an appeal and obtained an ex parte injunction as prayed for in LA. II on 2-9-1992. Petitioners' learned Advocate submitted that he was left with no option except to move this Court by way of the present civil revision petition and to pray for stay of that order which came to be granted. His basic submission is that on merits there is no case for the grant of any such orders against his clients but I refrain from commenting with regard to this aspect of the matter because the limited grievance before me is with regard to whether the appeal Court was justified in having passed the ex parte order or not.
(3.) Section 4 of the Act which has been reproduced by me is undoubtedly one of the few situations in which the legislature has enjoined upon a Court to issue notice to the defendant before passing any injunction orders. One of the reasons that provoked this action was because it came to the notice of the Courts and the legislature that in numerous cases patently false and incorrect statements are made even in writing and in the pleadings and all sorts of documents are produced sometimes genuine and sometimes otherwise, on the basis of which a Trial Court is genuinely convinced that the plaintiff is entitled to ad interim orders. The usual pleas are set out to the effect that the defendant has adopted an aggressive posture, often statements are made that violence is either used or threatened and these all end with the usual customary clause that irreparable damage will be done if an immediate injunction order is not passed. The prayer clauses in such applications are often extremely mischievous in so far as an injunction is often times asked for restraining the defendants from disturbing the plaintiffs possession when in fact it is the defendant who is in possession. On the basis of such an order, the defendant is forcibly dispossessed and thereafter the contention is taken up that the defendant is precluded from disturbing the plaintiffs possession by virtue of the Court orders. In order to obviate all these wrong practices, a safety provision has been incorporated in the Act which takes into account one very important factor namely that most agriculturists in rural areas are persons of limited means and persons who have hardly any fighting capacity and that therefore, they deserve a certain degree of initial protection. Also, it is a healthy rule that both sides of the case be examined before injunction orders are issued. With the pressures on the Courts and the various tactics adopted by those who conduct the litigations in the course of judicial proceedings, it has to be accepted that once an order is passed, that the party in whose favour that order is passed will ensure that it continues for several years even if an application for modification or vacation has been made. It is in this background that Section 4 requires notice to be given to the defendant before an injunction order is passed. This is in fact a salutary rule and one which Courts must follow at all times in all cases as far as possible unless a situation arises wherein grave injustice or failure of justice will result if an ad interim order is not passed. It is very necessary that the Courts take cognizance of the fact that there are always two sides to a case and that therefore, ad interim orders must necessarily be made time bound in order to ensure that the party who has obtained such an order does not thereafter resort to the many practices which are possible and permissible within the framework of law for taking advantage of that order and sustaining it for months and years together. The wrong practice that is being followed by the subordinate Courts is that lengthy pleadings are permitted at this stage, all sorts of documents are taken on record and a virtually full dressed argument takes place on the basis of this material culminating in a lengthy order dealing with the facts and law of the case which virtually pre-judges the entire dispute. This procedure is wrong and totally unnecessary nor should it be permitted because the grant of interim relief is not intended to be a rehearsal of the final decision but is on the basis of a quick and prima focie appraisal of the merits of the matter and is essentially intended to protect the interest of the parties who are before the Court. In these circumstances therefore, the interim stage must necessarily be completed quickly and in an abrupt manner and more importantly, ad interim orders passed must as a rule of practice be either confirmed or vacated within the course of a few weeks or at the most a month of the same having been passed.