M SUNNSAB Vs. RAMEEZABI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) the only point that has been canvassed by the petitioners in this case is that there is a complete bar of limitation that precludes the respondents who were the original plaintiffs, from executing the decree which was originally passed as early as on 12-7-1967 which assumed finality on 10-12-1975 when the second appeal came to be disposed of by this court. On 4-9-1992 an application was made to the executing court to give effect to that decree, whereupon the court transmitted the same to the deputy commissioner, tumkur with instructions to effect a partition by metes and bounds and put the 1st plaintiff in possession of her 1/3 share in the suit schedule properties. On coming to know of this, the present petitioners moved this court by way of the present revision petition. It would have been competent for the petitioners to have moved the executing court itself, because the only plea canvassed by them is that even if the decree had become final on 10-12-1975 that in any circumstance the application for execution ought to have been filed within a period of 12 years, which has not been done. Admittedly, the application in the present case has been made after a lapse of 17 years and it is contended by the petitioners learned Advocate that it is time barred.

(2.) respondent's learned Advocate has seriously disputed the position in law. He submits that this was a case of partition and that the law with regard to such situations is governed by Section 54 of the Code of Civil Procedure. His contention is that under Section 54, where a government or public authority is involved, that it is only required to give effect to the terms of the decree, for which purpose there is no bar of limitation. He placed strong reliance on a decision of this court in Ramagouda Rudregowda Patil and others v Smt.Lagmavva and others1. It is true that while considering certain other aspects relating to execution proceedings, the learned single judge of this court has upheld the view that where a decree requires partition of agricultural lands and the like at the instance of a public authority that the court has nothing to do with this process, and is only required to transmit the decree to the authority for necessary implementation. In these circumstances, a distinction was sought to be drawn between the execution proceedings in the true sense of the term where the whole responsibility lies on the civil court to give a concrete shape to the terms of the decree and a situation where a public authority is directed to implement it. The learned single judge, did take the view that since the court has virtually nothing to do in the circumstances that it cannot be termed as an execution in the true sense and, that therefore, the bar of limitation would not arise. The respondent's learned Advocate has demonstrated that in the reported decision a period of something like sixty years have elapsed and that the terms of the decree were still implemented. He submits that on the facts of the present case the decision would apply squarely and that, therefore, his clients were justified in having sought for execution. He states that for certain family reasons the decree was not executed earlier as often happens, but that the rights of the parties which have been finally adjudicated right up to this court, must necessarily be given effect to and that, therefore, this court ought not to interfere with the directions issued by the trial court.

(3.) with utmost respect to the views that were propounded by the learned single judge of this court in the decision referred to by me, it would be difficult to subscribe to the same or to uphold those views. The petitioner's learned Advocate has very clearly and correctly submitted that this is not a domestic action nor for that matter is it an arrangement that is being put into operation outside the powers of the executing court. He submits that the moment the decree was filed before the executing court, and appropriate action was asked for, that it becomes a full-fledged execution proceeding. Secondly, he demonstrates that the plaintiff has not sought to approach the public authority directly for purposes of implementing the terms of the decree but that the plaintiff has sought to enforce those terms through the executing court and, that therefore, there can be no two opinions about the fact that the instrumentality of the court is being used in this case. He submits, therefore, that irrespective of to whom the decree is transmitted that this is a full-fledged and clear cut execution proceeding for which the bar of limitation would come in if a period of more than 12 years has elapsed since the date when the decree was finally pronounced. To this extent, i find that the submissions canvassed by the learned Advocate are virtually unanswerable. One needs to take a clear perspective of the law which provides that execution proceedings necessarily presuppose the court machinery being pressed into service for purposes of giving concrete shape to what has been decided by the court prior to the decree having been passed. Once the dispute has been adjudicated undoubtedly, it is open to the parties to give effect to the decree in which case execution proceedings may not be necessary. If that does not happen, it is open to the decree-holder to execute the decree, for this purpose law prescribes a certain time-limit. It is a well known fact that circumstances change and everything in life gets altered not only the existence of people, situation of property, the rights in respect thereof, alienations etc. For this reason, the law prescribes a certain dead-line within which decrees must be executed, as otherwise, insurmountable difficulties would arise if an abnormally long time has elapsed. It is in this background that the law of limitation has laid down certain norms and a time-limit within which the terms of the decree must be implemented. The inevitable consequence is that if the decree is not given final shape within that period, it would virtually lapse.