KSHAMA KAPUR Vs. UNION OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In these two writ petitions, the following question of law arises for consideration :

(2.) The facts of the case, in brief; are as follow: (i) in W.P. No. 19860/86: The petitioner is a Medical Officer in the service of the Central Government in the Department of Health. She has presented this writ petition on 13-11-1986 praying for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the respondent to treat the service rendered by the petitioner on the establishment of the New Delhi Municipal Committee as the service rendered under the Central Government and to determine her seniority oh the said basis. (ii) Long prior to the presentation of the writ petition before this Court, the Act has come into force and a Central Administrative Tribunal has been constituted with effect from 1-11-1985 end a Bench of the Tribunal has also been established in the State of Karnataka. According to Section 14 of the Act, the Central Administrative Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate upon disputes and complaints in respect of service matters as also matters relating to recruitment of civil servants of the Union. Section 28 of the Act excludes the jurisdiction of all Courts except the Supreme Court and of the Industrial Tribunai and Labour Court in respect of matters which fall within the jurisdiction of the Administrative Tribunal. Section 29 of the Act provides for transfer of all cases pending before any Court except the Supreme Court under Article 136 if the subject matter falls within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The petitioner, however, has presented this petition before this Court, in view, of Section 19 of the Act. it reads :

(3.) The learned Advocate General submitted that when Sections 14 and 15 of the Act confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Administrative Tribunal, the fact that Section 19 provides for making an application against an order does not mean that unless there was an order of the Government or of any authority, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal cannot be invoked. He submitted that on a reading of Sections 14 and 15 of the Act, which specify the jurisdiction of the Tribunals and Sections 28 and 29 of the Act, which excludes the jurisdiction of all other Courts except the Supreme Court, it becomes clear that the Act confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal to decide all service matters and therefore even in the absence of any order passed by the Government or any other authority, an aggrieved civil servant can make an application before the Tribunal. He submitted that while construing the provisions of the Act, all the provisions of the Act should be read together to make the provisions of the Act consistent so that the purpose for which the Act is enacted, is achieved In support of this, he relied on the judgments of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v National Taj Traders (AIR 1980 SC 485 at 489) and in Tahsildar Singh v State of U.P. (AIR 1959 SC 1012 at 1022). He also submitted that Section 19 was a provision prescribing the procedure and the well settled rule of construction was that a procedural provision cannot be allowed to whittle own the ambit of a substantive provision. in support of the principle, he relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Veluswamy v Raja Nainar (AIR 1959 SC 422 at 426, Paragraph-8).