INDIAN BANK Vs. BLAZE AND CENTRAL P LTD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This writ appeal is by The Indian Bank against the order of the learned single Judge in Writ Petition No. 6889 of 1979 allowing the writ petition and setting aside the order of the Estate Officer made under S. 5 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971, ('the Act' for short) and the order of the III Additional District Judge and the Appellate Authority under the Act confirming the said order.

(2.) The facts of the case, in brief, are as follow: The appellant-Indian Bank, is established, owned and controlled by the Central Government. The premises bearing No. 9, K.G. Road, Bangalore-560 009, belongs to the Indian Bank. Therefore, the said premises is a public premises as defined under S. 2(e) of the Act. In respect of an area measuring 1140 sq. ft. of the said building, the first respondent was a tenant. The original period of lease expired in the year 1972. Thereafter, the first respondent was continuing as a tenant from month to month. A notice dt. 1st Mar., 1978, terminating the tenancy of the first respondent immediately on the expiry of 31st Mar., 1978 and calling upon the first respondent to vacate and deliver vacant possession was issued by the Manager of the Bank on 1st March, 1978. As even after the termination of tenancy by the aforesaid notice, the first respondent did not vacate the premises, the Estate Officer appointed by the Central Government for the purposes of the Act, issued a notice dt.20th Sept., 1978 under sub-sec. (1) of S. 4 of the Act to the first respondent and called upon him to show cause as to why an order of eviction should not be made against them. The first respondent gave its reply dt. 7th Oct., 1978 stating that the Bank did not really require the premises for its own use and occupation. The purport of the reply was that the respondent was not willing to vacate the premises. Thereafter, the Estate Officer proceeded with the inquiry in terms of S. 5 of the Act and passed an order of eviction on 16-11-1978. Aggrieved by the said order, the first respondent preferred an appeal before the Additional District Judge and the appellate authority. Before the appellate authority the plea of the first respondent was that no sufficient opportunity was given by the Estate Officer in the course of the inquiry conducted by him and therefore the order was violative of principles of natural justice and that the requirement of the premises for the use of the Bank was not bona fide and that they had some other premises and therefore the order of eviction was bad. The learned Additional District Judge found that sufficient opportunity had been given in the inquiry and there was no violation of principles of natural justice. As regards the plea of the first respondent that the requirement of the Bank was not bona fide and it had some other premises and that greater hardship would be caused by ordering eviction of the first respondent, the learned Additional District Judge held that those grounds were not at all relevant for passing the order of eviction under the Act. Accordingly the appellate authority dismissed the appeal. Aggrieved by the said order, the first respondent presented the writ petition.

(3.) In the writ petition, the first respondent pleaded as follows : The appointment of an officer of the Bank who is interested in evicting the first respondent as an Estate Officer for the purposes of the Act was opposed to principles of natural justice as there was every likelihood of bias on the part of the Estate Officer as he would be interested in passing an order of eviction. The Estate Officer denied reasonable opportunity to the first respondent in not giving sufficient opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses examined on behalf of the Bank and refused to give copy of the statement of the witness examined on behalf of the Bank without which the first respondent could not exercise his right of cross-examination effectively. The provisions of the Act were unconstitutional being violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution in that a different drastic procedure was prescribed for eviction of tenants of public premises as against the general law applicable to all tenants for their eviction from the premises under their occupation.