PATEL B ADEVAPPA Vs. SAMPURNAMMAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In these two writ petitions filed under Art.226 and 227 of the Constitution, the decision of the Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter to be referred aa the Tribunal dated 30-8-1973 (Ext.H) is sought t6 be quashed, and a writ in the nature of Certiorari is claimed in that respect. The case of the petitioners is, that they purchased the disputed lands under registered sale deed as long back as in 1963 from one Chikka Chowdappa and obtained actual possession and on the basis of such purchase they applied for registration of their rights under the Mysore (Pereonal and Miscellaneous) Inams Abolition Act 1954 (hereinafter to be referred as the -Inams Abolition Act) to the Special Deputy Commissioner for Inams Abolition the Respondent to the petition. The respondents 1 to 5 did not claim to be made parties to that application and the Special Deputy Commr considering the rights claimed by the petitioners, as established registered their claims against the survey numbers as Kadim tenants under S.4 of the Inams Abolition Act. In fact, as a result of the sale effected in favour of the petitioners by Chikka Chowdappa, a suit OS.257 of 1960 was filed in the Court of the II Munsiff, Bangalore. The dispute was taken up to the High Court as a second appeal was filed, but the title of the petitioners was maintained. After a period of 14 years, that has elapsed from the date of the order made by the Special Deputy Commr which was dated 25-10-58, the Respondents 1 to 5 preferred an appeal before the Tribunal which is the 8th respondent to the petition, challenging the correctness of the said regfetiation on several grounds. The appeal was filed on 4-9-72 under S.26 of the Inams Abolition Act. Assistance was sought by the respondents 1 to 5 under S.5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay which was obviously of near about 14 years. The Tribunal condoned that delay as it was stated that the respondents 1 to 5 came to know about the registration made by the Special Deputy Commr from the written statement filed by the petitioners in OS.289/72 which was instituted by the respondents 1 to 5 against the petitioners in the Court of the II Munsiff, Bangalore. That was a suit for injunction. It, was further contended before the Tribunal that from the date of knowledge the appeal was filed and it was well withim time and there was no delay. It was only by way of abundant caution that the application under S.5 of the Limitation Act was given by the respondents 1 to 5. The Tribunal accepted the plea of the appellant-respondents and held that the appeal was within time. Along with that petition for appeal, an application was also filed by the respondents 1 to 5 saying that certain documents were necessary to be gone into in order to prove their own title. These documents were bounded in two books and permission was sought for the production of such additional evidence. The petitioners at that time objected that the additional evidence could not be entertained and that the documents relied upon were disputed, controversial and did not come from proper custody. They further contended that the documents could only be accepted after proper opportunity was given to. the petitioners to contest their validity. They also asked for copies of such documents. According to the petitioners, Regln.16 of the Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal Regulations was relied upon by the respondents 1 to 5 to enable them to produce such documents. It was contended, that the statutory requirement enjoined the respondents to give prior copies of such documents and to afford proper opportunity to. rebut these documents. The petitioners' case is that the objections in this regard submitted by them remained undecided. The Tribunnal proceeded to consider the case on merits and by the help of these documents ultimately arrived at the decision that a right was made out in favour of the Respts. Besides, according to the petitioners, the respondent-appellants were not the persons aggrieved, as they had not claimed any right in their favour under S.10 of the Inams Abolition Act nor could they file an appeal under S.28 of that Act. Further according to the petitioners, the appeal was entirely time barred and could only be entertained within 30 days from the date of 'the decision, of the Special Deputy Commr. The limitation could not be claimed from the date of knowledge and at any rate, S.5 of the Limitation Act did not apply to the proceedings before the Tribunal. It is further contended that the arguments were not even heard on merits by the Tribunal. Rather, the arguments proceeded on the bare question of limitation :and despite that, the decision was given "on merit against the petitioners. In short, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to entertain the appeal beyond time at the instance ot the respondents is questioned, and the decision of the Tribunal allowing the appeal dated 30-8-73 (Ext.H) is sought to be quashed.

(2.) The respondents have controverted the allegations of the petitioners on every ground. It is submitted that the title as well as possess sion always vested with the respondents. They were in possession and were using the disputed land for a purpose which is non-agricultural. The respondents were not made parties to the registration proceedings before the Special Deputy Commissioner. It was only on 23-6-72 when the written statement was filed by the petitioners in the injunction suit OS.289/72 that the respondents came to know about the registration made in favour of the petitioners. On that very day, they applied for a certified copy of that decision. The certified copy was obtained by them on 1-9-72 and on 4-9-72 the appeal was filed before the Tribunal. As such, according to the respondents, the appeal was well within time as the limitation commenced from the date of knowledge and not from the date of decision. Besides, there were ether sufficient grounds for condonation of delay and S.5 of the Limitation Act very much applied to the proceeding before the Tribunal. It is contended that the permission was sought to produce the documents before the Tribunal in order to show thait the respondents wer the absolute owners and had complete interest in the properties. No doubt objections were raised by the petitioners as regards these documents, but they did not insis upon being heard on such objections, nor did they object at the appropriate time when the Tribunal considered these documents and arrived at the decision. It is also contended that the Tribunal possessed inherent power to accept the documents necessary for deciding the appeal. It was submitted that the respondents were the persons aggrieved and they could prefer the appeal under S.28 of the Inams Abolition Act. Even otherwise, the petitioners had full opportunity to refer to these documents and they could raise their own contentions in rebuttal to that evidence. In short, it is contended that the decision of -the Tribunal cannot be assailed on any of the grounds submitted by the petitioners.

(3.) From the state of pleadings delineated above, inter alia, three questions at once arise. The very first question related to the locus standi claimpd by the respondents 1 to 5 being the persons aggrieved for filing the appeal before the Tribunal. The second question pertains to the period of limitation within which that appeal could be preferred. The third question which is by far more important, refers to the procedure adopted by the Tribunal while admitting the additional evidence. At first, I propose to deal with the third question relating to the admission of documents by the Tribunal.