MANCH ALIAS CHIKKAHYDA Vs. DISTRICT JUDGE MANDYA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner preferred an appeal to the District Judge, Mandya under sub-sec. (2) of S.3 of the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 against the order passed by the Asst Commr, Mandya. The prescribed period of limitation under the said provision is 90 days. But, admittedly the petitioner preferred the appeal long after the prescribed period of limitation had expired. The learned District Judge, in the circumstances, dismissed the appeal as having been barred by limitation. Though an application for condonation of delay under S.5 of the Limitation Act was originally filed before the District Judge, the same was not pressed in view of the decision of this Court taking the view that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to, appeals presented under S.3(2) of the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act to the District Judge, having regard to the fact that the District Judge functions as persona designata and not as a Court.

(2.) In this writ petition, Sri B.M. Krishna Bhat, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, contended that though the provisions of the Limitation Act arc not applicable, the old Mysore Land Revenue Code or the corresponding Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 are applicable. He submitted that there are relevant provisions in the said enactments to the effect, that when an appeal is preferred the time required for obtaining the certified copies of the order appealed against has to be excluded. But, the real difficulty in the way of Sri Bhat in that the provisions of those enactments have not been made applicable to appeals under S.3 (2) of the Act to the District Judge. Sn Bhat has not been in a position to invite my attention to any provision making the provisions of the Mysore Land Revenue Code and the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 applicable. He, however, invited my attention to Rule 6 of the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Rules, 1961 which pertains to the power of the Deputy Commissioner in making enquiries. It provides that the Deputy Commissioner, in making enquiries under the Rules, may exercise all or any of the powers conferred on a Revenue Officer making formal or summary inquiry under the Code, and the procedure to be followed shall, as far as practicable, be the procedure prescribed in the CPC 1908, in respect of matters pertaining to summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath and compelling the production of documents. This rule only regulates the procedure to be followed by the Deputy Commissioner, while dealing with an application and making an enquiry under the Act. It does not regulate the procedure to be followed in disposing of appeals by the District Judge under sub-sec. (2) of S.3 of the Act. Hence, it is impossible to conclude from Rule 6 depended upon by Sri Bhat that any of the provisions of the Mysore Land Revenue Code and the corresponding provisions of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act pertaining to preferring of appeals are attracted to appeals preferred under S.3(2) of the Act. What is of great significance is that this Court in WP.2634 of 1972 between Doddarangaiah v. Lakshmamma, (1974) 1 KarLJ. 396, ruled as follows :

(3.) Before concluding, I must deal with the belated submission made at this stage by Sri Bhat. His contention is that the order of the Assistant Commissioner itself is liable to be quashed as it has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. It has to be pointed out that it is only the third respondent who was a party before the Assistant Commissioner. The petitioner was not shown as one of the persons interested in the land in the application filed by the 3rd respondent. Hence, it was not necessary for the Assistant Commissioner to issue any notice to the petitioner. The question of violation of principles of natural justice, therefore, does not arise.