LAWS(KAR)-1976-8-21

MAHBOOB BI Vs. MOHAMMAD MASTAN SAB

Decided On August 19, 1976
MAHBOOB BI Appellant
V/S
Mohammad Mastan Sab Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The revision is directed against the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge, Bangalore, dismissing the appeal filed by the tenant under section 48 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961, summarily, under section 29(4) of that Act. The respondent-landlord one Mohammed Mastan Saheb filed the petition under section 21(1)(a)(h) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for eviction of Smt. Mahboob Bi and the grounds were non-payment of rent and reasonable and bona fide requirement of the landlord. It was contended by the tenant that her husband was the previous tenant and as such she could not be proceeded against as no tenancy existed between her and the landlord. Besides, the reasonable and bona fide requirement of the landlord was also denied and it was contended that so much rent had not fallen in arrears. The learned Munsiff gave the findings that the petitioner Smt. Mahaboob Bi was the tenant and not her husband and that the landlord reasonably and bona fide required the premises for his own use and occupation and that the arrears of rent claimed were due and payable. Accordingly, the petition was granted.

(2.) The petitioner-tenant in appeal before the learned District Judge and at that stage, it was held that several opportunities were granted to the petitioner-tenant to pay all the arrears of rent due in respect of the premises and since that payment was not made, under sub-section (4) of section 29 of the Act the appeal was dismissed summarily. It is against that decision of the learned District Judge that the present revision under section 50 of the Act is filed. The sole point raised by the learned Counsel is that under sub-section (4) of section 29 of the Act, an opportunity was to be afforded to the tenant to show sufficient cause to the contrary to the order of dismissal of the appeal and unless that was done, the order of dismissal itself was without jurisdiction. The learned Counsel for the respondent pointed out that the appeal was filed on 3-4-74 and the learned District Judge immediately called upon the tenant to deposit the arrears of rent. Thereafter, the appeal was listed on 18-4-74 and time was granted to pay arrears upto 30-5-74. On that day, however, the learned Counsel who appeared for the appellant-tenant submitted that yet more time be granted to the tenant to make the deposit. The learned District Judge held that already more than two months time was granted to the appellant to make the deposit and therefore, no further time could be granted. He, therefore, considered that the cause shown by the tenant was not sufficient against the order of dismissal of the appeal. Thereafter, followed the order of summary dismissal of the appeal. The learned Counsel contended that another show cause notice was required to be given by the learned District Judge and only after the tenant had shown cause, that he could pass the order of dismissal of the appeal. I am constrained to observe that this would not be a correct legal position.

(3.) Sub-section (4) of section 29 of the Act does not prescribe for any mode of showing sufficient cause to the contrary. The showing of the cause shall of course be against the order of dismissal of the appeal which the appellate Court intended to pass. All that sub-section (4) says, is, that before the order of dismissal of appeal is passed, the tenant has to be given opportunity to show cause why that order should not be passed. In the instant case, the tenant was given opportunities to pay the arrears at two specific occasions before and also on 30-5-74 when the appeal was called for hearing. The only cause shown against the dismissal of the appeal was that he would pay the arrears within a fornight and therefore no order should he passed under sub-section (4). The learned District Judge considered the plea and rejected the same and dismissed the appeal summarily obviously under sub-section (4). In my opinion, due compliance was made of sub-section (4) and opportunity was afforded to the tenant to show cause against dismissal of the appeal.