COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX Vs. ROOPCHAND SESHMULL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a reference under section 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, which will be hereinafter referred to as the Act.

(2.) THE question of law referred for the opinion of this court is : "Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that registration should be granted to the firm."

(3.) IT is not disputed before us that the estate taken by Gattu Bai on the death of her husband Roopchand on November 29, 1955, became her absolute estate on the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act on June 17, 1956. After that date Gattu Bai was the absolute owner of that estate in view of section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act. IT is also not disputed before us that Gattu Bai's estate devolved solely on Jugraj on her death on August 9, 1959. After August 9, 1959, Jugraj was the owner of not only the estate of Gattu Bai, but also that of his adoptive father, Seshmull, subject to the rights obtained by Anoop Kunwar under section 3(2) of the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act (Act 18 of 1937). As Seshmull had died prior to the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, his widow, Anoop Kunwar, did not become his heir under the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act. But in view of section 3(2) of Act 18 of 1937, on the death of Seshmull his share in the joint family property had devolved on her, though, as the law stood then, she would have had only a life interest therein. The estate that had devolved on her is a statutory one. She had obtained a vested right in the same. The contention of Mr. Srinivasan, the learned counsel for the assessee, is that that estate inherited by Anoop Kunwar became her absolute estate after the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, in view of section 14(1) of that Act. On the other hand, it is contented by the learned counsel for the department that, though Anoop Kunwar had obtained a right to claim the share of her husband in the family properties, she having not claimed the same, consequently, she having not been divided in status from her adopted son, she could lay no claim for a separate share in the family property and, hence, the family can be represented only by Jugraj, its karta. We have now to consider which one of these contentions is correct.