SECRETARY BANGALORE TURF CLUB BANGALORE Vs. PRAKASH SRIVATSAVA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Bangalore Turf Club and Others raised an interesting issue of some consequence not only to the present appellants put to a large number of situations of the present type that are increasingly coming up before the law courts. Under the rules and regulations applicable to various clubs, organisations and authorities not to mention companies and corporations disputes are manifest in relation to the passing of what may broadly be termed as disciplinary orders. Where there is a charge of misconduct or impropriety or a corrupt practice is alleged, there are two stages that the proceedings go through. The first of them is invariably the interlocutory one when certain transitory action is taken such as an order of suspension or the issue of charge sheet, etc. and the second being the terminal stage when an adverse order often follows. Regardless of the rigour of such orders they are challenged on numerous occasions through various forms of proceedings. We are not immediately concerned with the first category here but to my mind, the broad principles that would be applicable as far as the approach of a court is concerned in all such situations will have to be redefined. By and large, in the absence of manifest and absolutely glaring illegality that almost constitutes a total perversion or negation of well defined procedural and natural justice principles, a court would refrain from interfering with such proceedings at an interlocutory stage. The issue gets far more complicated however when one reaches a situation of finality because the consequences or adverse orders are invariably harsh. The age old argument that is canvassed in such cases is that having exhausted the prescribed remedies, when the party approaches the law court, that the proceeding itself would virtually be rendered almost infructuous unless the adverse order is put into cold storage. The commonest situation is one where the order results in cessation of service or some similar penalty and the argument proceeds on the footing that unless the order is stayed, even if the aggrieved party were to ultimately succeed in the court proceedings, that the issue would be of little consequence because the damage is irreparable. It is necessary to take into account the damage that occurs during the interim period such as in the case of an employee who is dismissed from servicem, who undergoes not only personal trauma but domestic and social stigma, economic hardship and all of these cannot be adequately compensated through an order of either reinstatement or backwages at some point in the distant future. A strong case is therefore made out for some sort of relief during the interim period. On the other hand, the courts need to take cognizance of the unpleasant fact that judicial proceedings undoubtedly take a long time to get disposed of and that if the punishment order comes to be stayed, it is as good as setting it aside vis-a-vis the errant party concerned, as also those on whom it is supposed to have a deterrent effect and that, in the long run and in the ultimate analysis it constitutes manifest miscarriage of justice if that order is interfered with merely because some proceedings have been instituted.

(2.) What needs to be borne in mind and what emerges from a host of judicial decisions both in India and from other parts of the world is the principle that as far as such domestic trials are concerned, that there are well defined principles on the basis of which they are required to be conducted. These essentially centre around the principles of natural justice and what can be defined as an extention of those principles. The procedure to be followed is well defined, the essence being that the proceeding must pass the test of fairness and if this has been done, the court will then examine as to whether there is anything else that can be pointed out such as gross mala fides which essentially constitute vindictiveness, etc., and if it can be demonstrated on a prima facie appraisal of the record that the decision is so inherently bad or that the procedure has been so very wanting that no judicial authority would normally uphold the decision, it would be certainly a case for interference. Any court at the interim stage or at the stage when an appeal is preferred on such an order, it will confine itself to an appraisal along these lines. A court will also put itself on guard not to involve itself in too elaborate an examination because the parties before the court are entitled to fairness in the course of that ensuing trial both in the matter of adducing evidence and in the matter of making their a submissions, on the basis of that evidence and therefore a court will not record any definite findings nor will an appeal court for that matter, go into an indepth appraisal of the matter and make any observations that would either prejudge the issues or prejudice the parties. As indicated by me earlier, if interference is to be called for, the approach indicated by me is all that a court would follow. It is also equally necessary in this regard to bear in mind some of the special principles that apply to this class of cases which do border on the field of criminal law. The Supreme Court in the case of Sheriff v State of Madras, had occasion, while dealing with a situation more or less of the present type to lay down one of the guidelines that has held good for the last several decades when the court observed that whereas it is equally necessary that the guilty must be punished when facts are fresh in the public mind, pointed out with an equal degree of emphasis that it is of as much importance that an innocent person's reputation should be vindicated before the damage is too far gone. It is therefore a delicate balance that has to be applied in proceedings of this type and it is really that principle that will have to be put into obligation in the decision of these two appeals. It is however necessary for me to briefly recount the situation in which these issues have arisen.

(3.) The appellants before me who are the Bangalore Turf Club had conducted two enquiries in the month of December, 1994 and January, 1995 touching the conduct of the two plaintiffs who are race horse owners. I do not need to recount in great detail all aspects of the case except to mention that the two plaintiffs are father and son. The two incidents in respect of which action has been taken against them centre around two races one of them which was run in Bangalore in the month of July, 1994 and the other in Mysore in October, 1994. The proceedings that have been instituted by the Bangalore Turf Club cover not only the race that was held in this city under their jurisdiction but the action taken against the second plaintiff who is the son in relation to the Mysore incident which admittedly was in a race course run under the auspices of the Mysore Race Club. There is some controversy with regard to whether at all the Bangalore Turf Club (hereinafter referred to as the 'B.T.C.') would and ought to have exereised any powers in respect of the Mysore incident which aspect of the case I shall deal with. The enquiry was on the allegation that a particular horse by the name of Angel of Mercy which had run in the race at Mysore is alleged to have been jerked by the jockey at the start of the race. According to the stewards, this constituted a malpractice in relation to the fair conduct of the race insofar as it interfered with the free movement of the horse and therefore had a bearing on the outcome. The matter was enquired into at Mysore and both the jockey and the trainer were held guilty of the act of misconduct and certain fines were imposed on the two of them. The matter was reported to the B.T.C. and the Stewards commenced an enquiry in the course of which they examined all aspect of the case including the concerned jockies, trainers, etc., and finally came to the conclusion that the second plaintiff who is the son was also responsible for the incident and therefore held him guilty and penalised him. It is the case of the B.T.C. that a complaint was received from one jockey by the name of Kumar who alleged that the father Sri Kishan who is a race horse owner in his own right, is alleged to have instructed jockey Kumar who used to normally ride for him and who was to ride a horse by the name of Polite Applause on 20-7-1994, that he should interfere with and obstruct the favourite that was expected to win in that particular race. It is on the basis of this allegation that the enquiry proceeded and the Stewards held Sri Kishan guilty of having attempted to indulge in this malpractice. As a result of these findings, the two plaintiffs were awarded punishments which were briefly to the effect that they would not be able to enter the premises of the B.T.C. and other allied bodies for periods ranging from one and a half to two years and also that the horses registered under their names would not be eligible to take part in racing activity. The orders in question are subject to appeal and both the plaintiffs filed appeals which came to be rejected. In this regard, I may briefly deal with one aspect of the matter that does not require much consideration, to my mind. The plaintiffs who are respondents to these appeals filed two separate suits challenging the orders passed against them and applied for the grant of interim relief. The learned trial Judge heard the parties at considerable length and disposed of both the I As. through a common order. The learned Judge upheld the contention of the plaintiffs in both suits, that the balance of convenience lay heavily on the side of the plaintiffs, that irreparable injury would be done to them if the punishment orders were not stayed and consequently, directed that the orders shall not be given effect to until disposal of the suits. It is against these orders that the present appeals have been directed. One of the grounds on which the learned trial Judge was inclined to grant interim relief was the plea that the relevant rules prescribed that an appeal of this type is required to be disposed of as far as possible within a period of seven days and that in the present case, the orders were passed after ten days and that therefore, the order is ipso facto bad. This finding has been seriously assailed by the appellants and I need not go into any elaborate consideration with regard to the effect of non-disposal of an appeal within seven days. The spirit of the rule only requires that the appeal must be disposed of on a top priority basis which is why an extremely short period of seven days has been prescribed but the use of the words "as far as possible" clearly presupposes that the approach has to be reasonable. If there is wanton and unconscionable delay the disposal of the appeal, it is a different matter, but where the time prescribed has been marginally exceeded and where, as in the present case, there is a heavy record before the appellate authority, to my mind, such technicalities cannot be pressed into operation. The approach has got to be reasonable fair and judicious and merely because the disposal was after ten days, an argument can never be upheld that the order itself is vitiated. For an appellate order to be vitiated will require something more substantial than a mere overstepping of the time limit. Under these circumstances, I am unable to agree with the finding of the learned trial Judge in this regard.