LAWS(KAR)-1995-11-72

HUCHARAYA SWAMY Vs. CANARA BANK HEAD OFFICE BANGALORE

Decided On November 14, 1995
HUCHARAYA SWAMY Appellant
V/S
CANARA BANK, BANGALORE Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) these two petitions have been filed by two dismissed employees of the canara bank. I shall refrain from going into an elaborate narration of the facts because the issue involved is identical in both cases. Both the petitioners had joined the services of the bank several years earlier and had been employed by the institution on the ground that they belong to the reserved category. In this case, they had represented that they belong to scheduled caste category insofar as their caste was kotegara. There is no dispute about the fact that persons belonging to kotegara caste come within the category of scheduled castes and consequently, the bank treated them as such. Several years had elapsed and in the year 1987, since it had come to the notice of the bank that these two persons had allegedly misrepresented their caste, after verification with the authorities who confirmed that the petitioners belong to the ramakshatriya caste and not to kotegara caste, the bank charge-sheeted the employees in question. An enquiry proceeded which resulted in an adverse finding and the disciplinary authority accordingly passed an Order dismissing the petitioners from service. The two petitioners have filed separate petitions but the orders and the facts being identical, the two petitions have been heard together and are being disposed of through a common judgment. The defence of the bank in this case is of some significance. In the first instance, it is pointed out that since there has been large-scale abuse of the special facilities afforded to persons belonging to scheduled caste and scheduled tribe, that the government of India itself has directed the institutions both educational and otherwise to verify these claims and to take appropriate action in those cases where the claims were found to be incorrect. The bank points out that in the present instance it received documentary confirmation from the authorities to whom the matter was referred, that the school records of the petitioners very clearly indicate that they belong to ramakshatriya caste which does not come in the list of scheduled caste and that they were required to institute disciplinary proceedings because it was very clear to the bank that the petitioners misrepresented their caste at the time when they secured employment. The disciplinary authority has recorded an adverse finding and the bank contends that since this was a clear case of fraud that was established after the holding of an enquiry, that the Order of dismissal from service was fully justified. It is also contended that the bank has followed the requisite procedure and that therefore no interference is required. A subsidiary contention that was raised was that since there is a dispute with regard to certain aspects of the enquiry that was held particularly the validity of the enquiry officer's Order, that the employee concerned is entitled to raise an industrial dispute and that since an alternative remedy is available, this court must refuse to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the constitution.

(2.) as far as this last aspect of the matter is concerned, it is in the nature of a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the petition. The respondents' learned Advocate has relied on a recent decision of this High Court in Mohini K. V. General Manager, Syndicate Bank, Manipal and others, wherein an employee of the Syndicate Bank had been dismissed from service and the Order was sought to be challenged through a writ petition under Article 226 of the constitution of india. The learned single judge of this court held that the respondent-bank is an industry within the meaning of the industrial disputes ACT and that a comprehensive remedy other than the one available under Article 226 of the constitution was available to the petitioner and that therefore, this court would refuse to exercise jurisdiction. Respondents' learned Advocate submits that in the light of that decision the present petitions are liable to be dismissed on the ground that a clear alternative remedy is available and that consequently, if the petitioners are aggrieved they can avail of that alternative. I need to note here that undoubtedly this court has taken the view that an alternative remedy under the industrial disputes ACT is available in such cases. There is no dispute about the correctness of this position in law. There is no bar on the High Court in exceptional cases entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the constitution even if an alternative remedy is available, though it is well settled law that the court will normally not invoke its extraordinary jurisdiction in such cases. The question however arises as to the stage at which the court will take such a decision. It needs to be noted that if a litigant has approached a wrong forum or an inappropriate forum, that it is certainly open to that forum or authority to redirect the litigation to the most appropriate or the correct one. This presupposes the fact that the objection will be canvassed by the office or the opponent at the very threshold and the court will decide it. One needs to take cognizance of the time factor and the other significant aspect involved and it is equally good law that in those of the cases where a petition has been admitted, in other words where the court has exercised jurisdiction and where the case has come up for final hearing after several years, that the court would not at that late point of time redirect the litigation elsewhere. Apart from the wastage of judicial time, appropriateness and the timing of the Order are all of consequence in such instances. Therefore, the objection must be raised at the earliest point of time so that if it is pointed out to the court that a clear alternative is available, the petitioner can be directed to go there. I do not in the circumstances of this case and at this late stage consider it either proper or appropriate to uphold such an objection at the final hearing of the petition.

(3.) the petitioners' learned Advocate has attacked the validity of the dismissal Order principally on the ground that the petitioners in this case had both obtained the requisite caste certificate from the competent authority namely the tahsildar. Guidelines issued by the government of India are eloquent with regard to the reason for the choice of this particular officer and briefly stated what is set out there is that the authority having revenue jurisdiction over the area where the applicant is normally a resident or hails from is the most appropriate authority competent to examine issues relating to caste or community because there are several local circumstances such as relatives, the community, education and employment background etc., all of which require to be looked into and it is for this reason that the powers are specially designated to this authority. Petitioners' learned Advocate submits that once a caste certificate is issued, that it has presumptive value but more importantly certain rights flow from that document. The certificate issued by the legally designated authority is presumed to be not only valid but correct. Therefore in matters of education, employment etc., it is not only permissible but it is obligatory for the concerned officers and authorities to respect such certificates and give effect to these. It was for this reason that the bank accepted the certificates and employed the two petitioners'.