MUMTAZ Vs. KARNATAKA ELECTRICITY BOARD BANGALORE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) this petition can conveniently be disposed of at this stage as both the learned advocates representing the petitioner as also the Karnataka electricity board have been heard completely. The grievance projected by the petitioner who is a widow of a lineman who had met with an accidental death in the year 1983, is that her application for compassionate employment has been turned down by the board. The Order of the board that is impugned is dated 10-7-1992 and states that since the death has occurred on 23-8-1993, that the application cannot be considered at this point of time. It is necessary for me to record here that the board had promulgated a scheme for compassionate employment in deserving cases where an employee had met with sudden death and consequently where the family was reduced to penury as a result thereof. The scheme envisaged that the application for compassionate employment of a dependent family member had to be made to the board within a period of 3 years which period was subsequently increased to 5 years. The objective behind prescribing this limitation was self-evident insofar as it is the intention behind the scheme to provide urgent and immediate succour to the dependents of the deceased employee who are otherwise in a condition of extreme poverty as a result of the death of the bread winner. Over a period of time, the circumstances do get altered and therefore it is not expedient to keep the benefit open for an abnormally long time. Secondly, since the intention is to provide transitory relief, it would frustrate the purpose of the scheme if it is given effect to after many years. However, it needs to be noted that obviously the board took note of the fact that the family members of class-iii and class-iv staff particularly who would be the ones for whom essentially this scheme was framed, would have their own difficulties and limitations in approaching the board and therefore, an extremely generous time frame was prescribed. The basic objective however was to provide immediate transitory relief and therefore it is necessary to specify that this long period of limitation essentially was in Order to make an allowance for those persons who came at a rather late stage but still deserved help.

(2.) in the present case, the petitioner contends that she applied in the year 1985, that is, I think, within the prescribed time frame and that some subordinate employee of the board is supposed to have accepted the application. Unfortunately, the application did not reach the area where it could be taken up for consideration. Therefore, the petitioner contends that several further applications were made and the last one was in the year 1992 which came to be rejected on the ground of limitation. A strong plea has been put up by the learned Advocate that in matters relating to compassionate relief the court should adopt a humanitarian approach and should strike down an Order which mechanically states that merely because it is after the prescribed time period, that it cannot be considered. His contention is that the petitioner was repeatedly approaching the board and that it is not her fault if the applications were not taken up for consideration. Unfortunately, there is no evidence of the initial application and therefore, one can only make a reference to the last one. This admittedly was filed at a very late stage. By that time 9 years had passed and the board therefore rejected the application from consideration on the ground that it was completely outside the framework of the scheme prescribed. It is not a question of adopting a humanitarian approach but a correct appraisal of the situation would require that the dominant intention behind framing of the scheme is not abused or misused. If the intention of the scheme is to provide immediate transitory relief then an application which is filed well beyond the period prescribed would certainly not qualify for such benefit for the reason that it is obvious that the family by then has overcome the crisis. The usual statements, excuses are made in these applications, but it is equally necessary for the board to genuinely assess the need in these cases. It is not as though the dependents of a deceased employee are left penniless insofar as the laws prescribe several forms of compensations; the board pays the terminal benefits apart from which in those of the cases such as the present case where the employee is entitled, there is a pension payment. Under these circumstances the mere mechanical averments that the dependents are in dire need is not to be taken as sacrosanct. It is also necessary to bear in mind the fact that the law prescribes a certain well regulated formula for employment and this can be bypassed only in exceptional cases and really deserving ones. If the argument of the appellants learned Advocate were to be accepted, it would virtually open the floodgates and public authorities may have to virtually curtail the normal channels of employment. This is not the scheme of the law and therefore, the welfare scheme formulated by the board will have to be selectively applied in appropriate cases within the period prescribed.

(3.) the second argument that was pressed into operation was that the scheme itself prescribes for employment of dependent children after they attain majority. The petitioner's learned Advocate submits that the provision will have to be interpreted to mean that regardless of the age of the minor child on the date of the death that the board is duty bound to consider the application within 3 years of the minor child attaining majority. The learned Advocate who represents the board has submitted that this was never the intention. He contended that in those of the cases where the person asking for employment happens to be a minor son or daughter that the intention was to employ such a person provided the child is close to the age of majority at the time of the death.also, this cannot override the basic requirement that the application must be made within the prescribed period of time. This to my mind would be the most rational and correct method of interpreting the provision. The basic Rule of interpretation is to avoid absurdity. If the argument of the appellants learned Advocate were to be accepted that regardless of the age of the minor the application would be maintainable within the 3 years of the offspring attaining the majority, it would lead to a possibly reckless situation where even 10,15,20 years after the date of the death the applications would still qualify. This is contrary to the basic intention of the scheme and therefore cannot be permitted. The only rational and correct method of interpreting the scheme would be to Rule that in those of the cases where the person seeking employment has not attained majority, but is very close to that position that the board should consider the case if he/she so qualifies. The condition precedent being that the application is being made within the prescribed time and that the overall period between the death of the employee and the date on which employment is sought does not exceed the outer limit of 3 years. This to my mind is the only correct way of interpreting the scheme.