(1.) Heard appellant's learned Advocate.
(2.) He points out that the Tribunal has erred rather seriously in this case, because the owner, for a variety of reasons, was not made a party to the proceeding. He points out that this fact did come to the notice of the learned Presiding Judge towards the end of the proceedings, but at that point of time, no corrective steps were taken. On a strict construction of law, the learned Advocate points out that the compensation claim could only have been adjudicated against the owner and the solitary purpose of making the Insurance Company a party is because the insured indemnified the owner against the claim and would, therefore, be the party which is required to actually disburse the compensation amount. There can be no two opinions about the fact that this is the correct position in law and that under no circumstance, should the Tribunals proceed with the matter without ensuring that the owner of the vehicle is a party defendant. On the basis of this submission, the learned Advocate points out to me that the award would have to be set aside. Under normal circumstances, such an order would have followed as a matter of course. In this case, however, even though the objection canvassed is a material and substantial one, it is really academic because even if the owner were to be cited as a party defendant and a denovo hearing ordered, the Insurance Company cannot deny its liability to pay the compensation since the policy was in existence. To that extent, therefore, the question arises as to whether any useful purpose would be served by re-routing the matter through the trial Court once again. The incident in question has taken place on 12.9.1982, the matter was decided on 7.3.1988 and if a remand were, to be ordered at this point of time, it would only be oppressive and would result in the same final order. Under these circumstances, I am of the view that even though the objection raised on behalf of the Insurance Company is upheld, no useful purpose will be served by remanding the matter.
(3.) The Appeal shall accordingly stand disposed of with these directions. Interim orders, if any, to stand vacated.