NATIONAL INSURANCE CO LTD Vs. LEELAVATHI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These appeals are by the Insurance Company challenging the finding and order of the Tribunal fixing its liability in respect of the accident.

(2.) IT is not disputed that the vehicle involved in the accident, namely, CAK 1887, was insured for the period 8.11.1986 to7.11.1987. The accident in question occurred on 11.3.1987, out of which several claims by the passengers travelling in the said vehicle have arisen. The contention taken by the appellant before the Tribunal as well as in this appeal is that since the bus in question did not have a valid permit to ply on the road, there is violation of the terms of the policy, and as such, no liability can be foisted upon it in respect of the accident involving the vehicle. The copy of the Insurance policy, which is not disputed is produced and marked as Ex.R -1 through RW -1. Under the head limitations as to use it is stated, inter alia, thus: Use only under a Contract carriage or stage carriage permit within the meaning of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. There is no serious dispute that the bus in question had a permit either as a Contract carriage or Stage carriage. Ex.R -2 is the verification certificate produced by the Insurance Company itself in which the permit particulars are stated. Among other things, item 4 pertains to the period of permit which is stated to be 11.3.1987 to 20.3.1987. Of course, Item 3 pertaining to route authorised to ply the vehicle, is blank. The contention of Mr. S. Raju, learned Counsel for the appellant, appears to be that since the bus commenced its journey from Madras at 10 p.m. on 10.3.1987, it constitutes violation of the terms of the policy. The accident in question occurred near Bangalore at about 4.30 a.m. on 11.3.1987. Assuming that there was no permit when the bus started its journey from Madras to Bangalore, it cannot be disputed that at the time of the accident the bus was covered by availed permit. Even, otherwise, an argument of this kind cannot be countenanced in view of the settled law as to the manner in which a beneficial legislation is to be interpreted. Although the authorities in this regard are legion we would only refer to Skandia Insurance Company Limited v. Kokilaben Chandravadan and Ors. AIR 1987 SC 1184, it is stated thus: These must be therefore (be) interpreted in the spirit in which the same have been enacted accompanied by an anxiety to ensure that the protection is not nullified by the backward looking interpretation which serves to defeat the provision rather than to fulfil its life -aim. To do otherwise would amount to nullifying the benevolent provision by reading it with a non -benevolent eye and with a mind not tuned to the purpose and philosophy of the legislation without being informed of the true goals sought to be achieved. Even if one were to make a strictly doctrinaire approach, the very same conclusion would emerge in obeisance to, the doctrine of 'reading down' the exclusion clause in the light of the 'main purpose' of the provision so that the 'exclusion clause' does not cross swords with the 'main purpose highlighted earlier. The effort must be to harmonize the two instead of allowing the exclusion clause to snipe successfully at the main purpose, xxxxxxx. This lays the provisions impotent.

(3.) IN that view of the matter, the main contention urged in this appeal fails. Consequently, these appeals have to fail and accordingly dismissed. No costs.