KRISHANJI GURUNATH Vs. USHA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a tenant's revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The petition is directed against the order of the District Judge, Bijapur dated 29.6.1982. It was passed in H.R. C.R.P. No. 92 of 1981, on his file. That revision was preferred by the landlord, the legal representatives of whom are respondents in these proceedings.

(2.) THE landlord had presented a petition under provision (a) to sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') inasmuch as the tenant had failed to pay the arrears of rent after due service of notice on him, within two months from the date of service of notice. The tenant resisted the eviction petition on the ground that he had paid all the arrears of rent and pleaded that he was out of job as the Khadi Board in Karnataka had removed him from service for some reason. In that position, he contended that he was without salary etc. and that therefore, he could not pay the arrears of rent within two months time stipulated in the notice. As is evidenced by the order of the learned Munsiff, that fact is not in controversy or in dispute. Accepting that case of the tenant, the Munsiff, in exercise of his discretionary jurisdiction under sub-section (2) of Section 21 of the Act, held that the tenant had sufficient cause not to have paid the arrears of rent demanded in the notice and having regard to the fact that he had paid all the arrears of rent after the petition was presented in Court, he refused to make an eviction order in terms of his discretionary power under sub-section (2) of Section 21 of the Act. It was against that order that the revision was preferred before the learned District Judge.

(3.) IN the case, Ramaiah v. Narasaiah, ILR 1985 Kar. 2325. I have in detail, discussed the scope of Clause (a) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Act as well as sub-section (2) of the same section. I have referred to the earlier decisions of this Court on this aspect as well as the view of the Supreme Court of India as to what constitutes 'sufficient cause." In that case, I have held that the judicial consideration of the expressions 'wilful default' and 'sufficient cause' really have no difference. What is not wilful default will always constitute sufficient cause. The mere employment of different language does not make any difference to the discretionary approach which a Judge required to make in finding out whether there was wilful default in payment, as required under Section 21(2) of the Act. I have also pointed out, as laid down by another learned Judge of this Court, that a liberal construction would be available in favour of the tenant and that in appreciating what is said to be sufficient cause for default in payment under Clause (a) of the proviso to sub-section 21 of the Act would be an instance where liberal construction may be resorted to.