(1.) THE question of law that calls for decision by us reads thus :- "Whether a usufructuary mortgagee is a landlord for purposes of Part-II of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 ?"
(2.) THE facts leading to the controversy may be recapitulated :-
(3.) WE have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the usufructuary of Section 3 of the Act, that a usufructuary mortgagee for all intents and purposes is a landlord and that he could legally claim the premises which fall vacant for his personal use and occupation. On the other hand, Mr. R. Gunashekhar, learned counsel appearing for the tenant, submitted that the Act is beneficial piece of legislation, that the main object of the Legislature is to prevent harassment and hardship to tenants, that the usufructuary mortgagee, keeping in view the scheme and object of the Act, would not fall within the definition of 'landlord' so far as Part-II of the Act is concerned, and that he is not legally entitled to claim the premises which fall vacant for his personal use and occupation. It was further submitted by the learned counsel that if every person who falls within the definition of clause (h) of Section 3 of the Act is treated to be a landlord, then the whole object of the Act would be frustrated inasmuch as under clause (h) a person who is for the time being receiving or entitled to receive rent in respect of any premises whether on his own account or on account, or on behalf, or for the benefit of any other person is also termed as landlord and by no stretch of imagination such a person can be held to claim the premises for his personal use and occupation. The learned counsel buttressed his argument by contending that the opening part of Section 3 of the Act itself qualifies the definitions in that Section by stating "unless the context otherwise requires", and if the scheme and object of the Act is kept in view, then except the real owner of the property no other person shall fall within the definition of 'landlord' for purpose of Part-II of the Act. The learned counsel has commended to us to accept the view of the Division Bench in Subramanayaswamy's case. As is evident from the order of the Division Bench, the necessity of reference has arisen because of the conflicting view in the two judgments referred to in the earlier part of the judgment. In Aswatharamaiah's case, after noticing the facts, the learned Single Judge has observed thus :