KHATIJA BI Vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In this petition the constitutional validity of Secs.48 and 48A of tha Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) as amended by Karnataka Land Reforms (Amendment) Act 1973 (Karnataka Act 1 of 1974) (hereinafter referred to as the Amending Act) arises for consideration. It is filed against the order of the Land Tribunal, Supa, District Karwar declaring that the 4th Respondent was the tenant entitled to be treated as the occupant of a land. The Petitioner was the owner of the land prior to 1-3-1974.

(2.) The Act received the assent of the President in the year 1962. It came into force on. 2-10-1965. It was included in the IX Sch of the Constn by the Constn (17th Amendment) Act. Therefore its validity was questioned before the Supreme Court in N.Krishna Bhat v. State of Mysore, WP. 202 1966 SC which was heard and decided along with Golaknath v. State of Punjab, AIR. 1967 SC. 1643 In the said decision Subba Rao CJ, upheld the constitutionality of the Act on the ground that it had been included in the IXth Sch after thq amendment of the Constn. Hidayatullah, J upheld it on the ground that it squarely fell within the scope of Art.31.A of the Constn and it could not there fore be questioned on the ground that it was inconsistent with Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constn. Thereafter by the Amending Act the Act was amended. The Amending Act introduced certain radical amendments into the Act, whereby among other changes the ceiling that had been imposed by the Act earlier on the extent of land that can be possessed, by a person or a family was reduced, provision was made for the constitution of the Tribunals for the purpose of performing the duties mentioned in Sec.112B of the Act and the exemption accorded to religious institutions was taken away. Some of the provisions of the Amending Act were questioned before this Court earlier. In Thippeswamy v. State of Karnataka, 1974 2 KarLJ. 518 AIR. 1975 Kar. 53. and Bhaskar Krishnaji v. State of Karnataka, 4. (1974) 2 KarLJ. 509 AIR. 1975 Kar. 55. I upheld the constitutionality of the Act as amended by the Amending Act on the ground that it was fully protected by Art.31A of the Constitution.

(3.) In the meanwhile some petitions were admitted by another learned Judge of this Court. In some other petitions filed on behalf of certain Religious Institutions which came before me it was contended that the provisions of the Amending Act were open to question under Art.26 of the Constn. I admitted them and referred them to a Division Bench for disposal. Those petitions have remained till this day, undisposed of. After the decisions upholding the constitutionality of the Amending Act were rendered by me, two events happened. By the Constn (34th Amendment) Act 1974 which came into force on 7-9-1974 the Amending Act was included in the 9th Sch of the Constn, whereby it acquired the protection of Art.31B of the Constn. In Acharya Maharajshri Narendra Prasadji Anandprasadji Maharaj v. State of Gujarat, AIR. 1974 SC. 2098. (decided on 3-10-1974) the Supreme Court held that an Act containing provisions enacted in furtherance of agrarian reform was not hit by Art.26 of the Constn, although it had the effect of depriving the religious intitutions of agricultural lands possessed by them. The relevant portion of the decision of the Supreme Court at para 29 reads as follows : " When we look at the object of the Act and of the various provisions enacted in furtherance of agrarian reform, the Act is squarely protected under the saving provision of Art.31A. But it is then submitted that Art.31A does not provide against the vice of contravention of Art.26 while Arts.14, 19 and 31 are expressly mentioned in Art.31A. The question, therefore, arises whether the right under Art.26(c) is an absqlute and unqualified right to the extent that no agrarian reform can touch upon the lands owned by the religious denominations. No rights in an organised society can be absolute. Enjoyment of one's rights must be consistent with the enjoyment of rights also by others. Where in a free play of social forces it is not possible to bring about a voluntary harmony, the State has to step in to set right the imbalance between competing interests and there the Directive Principles of State Policy, although not enforceable in Courts, have a definite and positive role introducing an obligation upon thq State under Art.37 in making laws to regulate the conduct of men and their affairs. In doing so a distinction will have to be made between those laws which directly infringe the freedom of religion and others, although indirectly, affecting some secular activities of religious institutions or bodies. For example if a religious institution owns large areas of land far exceeding the ceiling under relevant laws and indulges in activities detrimental to the interests of the agricultural tenants, who are at their mercy, freedom of religion or freedom to manage religious affairs cannot be pleaded as a shield against regulatory remedial measures adopted by the State to put a stop to exploitation and unrest in other quarters in the interest of general social welfare. The core of religion is not interfered with in providing for amenities for sufferers of any kind. We take the view that the Act and its provisions do no violence to the rights guaranteed under Art. 26 (c) . In the view we have taken it is also not necessary to mention Art.26 in Art.31A and its omission therein is not at all of any consequence"