ERIC A SUARES Vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner in the above writ petition has questioned the validity of the provisions of S.7(ii) of the Karnataka Rent Control (Amendment) Ordinance, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance). The petitioner is a tenant of a premises situated in Civil Station, Bangalore and respondent 2 is the landlord of the said premises. The 2nd respondent instituted proceedings for the eviction of the petitioner under the provisions of the Karnataka House Rent Control Act, 1961, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) in HRC.471/1972 on the file of the Principal Munsiff, Civil Station, Bangalore. The said petition was allowed by the learned Munsiff directing the petitioner to vacatiq the premises within four months by his order dt.9-4-1975. The petitioner had a right of appeal under S.48 of the Act against the order of the; learned Munsiff and the said right came to be vested in him when the petition was filed in the Court of the Munsiff. But, on 22nd May 1975, the Governor of Karnataka promulgated the Ordinance by which S.48 was repealed and it was provided that any person who but for the omission of 9.48 of the Act could have filed an appeal to, the Dist Judge was permitted to file, a revision before the Dist Judge within 30 days from the, date of commencement of the Ordinance. The Dist Judge was directed to dispose of the petition as if it was a revision petition under sub- sec (2) of S.50 of the Act as amended by the Ordinance. The petitioner had not filed an appeal against the order of the Munsiff on May 22, 1975, and the right to file an appeal was taken away by S.7 (ii) of the Ordinance.

(2.) Shri E. Jayachandra Raj, learned Counsel for the petitioner, has questioned the validity of S. 7 (ii) of the Ordinance on the ground that his right tc file the appeal which became vested on thej date on which the petition was instituted before the Court of the Munsiff could not be taken away retrospectively. There is no substance in this contention. It is no doubt true that right of appeal is a vested right and it becomes vested in a litigant on the date on which the proceedings are initiated in the Court of first instance. But that right can be taken away by the Legislature by a subsequent law. Following the decision of the Privy Council in Colonial Sugar Refining Co Ltd v. Irving, 1905 App Cases 369. the Supreme Court observed in Girijapati v. Subbiah Choudhry, AIR 1957 SC 949. as follows :

(3.) The last sub-paragraph of the portion of the Supreme Court's decision extracted above clearly establishes that it is permissible for the Legislature to take away the right of appeal by a subsequent enactment by expressly providing for it or by necessary intendment. As already mentioned by the Ordinance, S.48 was repealed. With regard to persons who but for the omission of S.48 could have filed an appeal before the Dist Judge, the Ordinance provided that it was open to them to file a petition to the Dist Judge within 30 days from the date of commencement of the; Ordinance and that the Dist Judge should dispose of the said petition as if it was a revision petition under sub-sec(2) of 3.50 of the Act as amended by the Ordinance. It is clear from Sec.7(ii) of the Ordinance that by necessary intendment the right of appeal which the petitioner had acquired on the date of the institution of the petition in the Court of the Munsiff had been taken away.