SHAVANGOUDA BASANGUDA PAVADIGOUDARS Vs. LAXMAPPA GANGAPPA BASHIDONI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner in the above writ petition is the 1st respondent in MA.37 of 1972 on the file of the Dist Judge, Belgaum. The said appeal was preferred by respondents 1 and 2 herein before the Dist Judge, Belgaum, against the order d .25-4-1972 passed by the Asst Commr, Bailhongal, in WTN/AP/9/1971 in favour of the petitioner under the provisions of S.3(1) cf the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The appeal was filed on 19-10-1972. Along with the appeal, an application was filed by the appellants therein under S.5 of the Limitation Act requesting the Dist Judge to condone the delay in preferring it. It was also pleaded that as the appellants before the Dist Judge did not have knowledge of the order passed by the Asst Commr till 26-9-1972, the appeal filed on 19-10-1972 was in time. In support of the latter contention, the appellants before the Dist Judge produced an affidavit sworn to by their Counsel Shri D.H.Nyamsgoudar who had appeared on their behalf before the Asst Commr. In that affidavit Sri D.H.Nayamagoudar stated that the case was heard by the Asst, Commr on 25-4-1972 and the order was not prounounced in his presence. No date was given in his presence by the Asst Commr for the pronouncement of the order. It was further stated that after the arguments in the case were over, the Asst Commr took up another case for hearng. Thinking that the order would be pronounced on a subsequent date and the communication of the same would be sent to him or to his clients, he left the Court Hall of the Asst Commr. As he was not able to know the result of the case before the Assst Commr till 10-9-1972, he wrote a letter to the Asst Commr to intimate him the result of the case. In reply to the said latter, the Asst Commr wrote a letter on 26-9-1972 stating that the appeal had been disposed of on 25-4-1972 itself. On the basis of the above statements made by the learned Counsel in the affidavit, it was contended before the Dist Judge that prior to 26-9-1972 neither the petitioner nor his Counsel had notice of the pronouncement of the order which was under appeal. The learned Dist Judge on the basis of the material placed before him came to the conclusion that the appellants before, him neither knew that an order had been passed against them nor had any opportunity to know that such an order had been passed until 26-9-1972. He therefore held that the appeal was in time. In view of that finding, the question of considering the application under S. 5 of the Limitation Act, did not arise. This writ petition is presented against the order passed by the Dist Judge holding that the appeal was in time.

(2.) Shri W.K.Joshi, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, contended that the appeal which had been filed beyond 90 days from 25-4-1972 on which date the order was passed by the Asst Commr, should have been held to be barred by time. In support of his contention, he relied on sub-sec (2) of S.3 of the Act which stated that a person aggrieved by any decision given under sub-sec (1) might file an appeal to the Dist, Judge of the Dist within 90 days of such decision He argued that the time would begin to run from the date of the order and not from the date on which the party against whom it was pronounced came to know of the existence of the order. Reliance was also placed on the decision of this Court in Majali Group Grama Vividha Udeshagala Sahakari Sangh v. Viswanath Vamanrao Kulkarni, WP. 1440 71 d .9-10-73, in which, it was held that under the provisions of the Co-operative Societies Act and the Rules made thereunder, the time for preferring the appeal would begin to run from the date on which it was delivered and not from the date on which the party was informed about pronouncement of the order cr had an opportunity to know that such an order had been passed. Another decision on which reliance was placed by Mr W.K.Joshi was tho decision in G. R. Nanjundaswami v. MSTAT, (1971) 2 MysLJ. 315, (2), in which it had been held by a Divn Bench of this Court that under S 64A of the Motor Vehicles Act, a revision petition had to be filed within 30 days from the date on which the order was passed by the authority below and not from the date on which the aggrieved party came to know of the existence of such order. The latter decision is distinguishable from the facts of the present case, on two grounds. First, S G4A deals with the rcvisional power of a superior authority but not with the right of appeal of a party. Secondly in that case the Divn Bench relied upon the decision in Municipal Board, Pushkar v. State Transport Authority, AIR. 1965 SC. 458, in which, on a consideration of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, the Supreme Court had held that the time for filing a revision petition under S 61A of the Act began to run iron the date on which the order was passed by the lower authority. We do not have in the Act provisions similar to the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act. Hence no assistance can be derived by the petitioner from the above decision.

(3.) I am of the view that the case on hand is governed by the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court, in Raja Harish. Chandra Raj Singh v. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer, AIR.1961 SC.1500. In para 6 of the said decision, P.B. Gajendragadkar, J. (as he then was) observed as follows :