(1.) This revision petition springs from a suit brought by a lessor for the recovery of rent. The lease was an ancient mulgem lease between the ancestors of the plaintiff and the ancestors of defendant 1. It is not disputed that defendant 1 as the manager of the Hindu joint family to whom the lease was originally granted, was in occupation and possession of the land until 1959 paying the agreed rent to the plaintiff. But on May 11, 1955, under Exhibit B. 3 defendant 1 sold a portion of the property to defendant 2. He made yet another sale under Exhibit B. 4 on March 2, 1957 of the remaining property. On March 5, 1959 a registered notice Exhibit B. 1 was sent by both defendants 1 and 2 to the plaintiff intimating him that there was a sale. On February 26, 1963, the plaintiff brought his suit for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 159 which, according to him, was the rent due for a period of three years following the second sale under Exhibit B. 4. In the plaint, the plaintiff sought a decree against defendant 1 who, according to him, was his lessee. He also asked in the alternative for a decree against such defendant as in the opinion of the Court was liable to pay the rent.
(2.) Defendant 2 did not contest the claim but defendant 1 repudiated his liability on the ground that his liability to pay the rent came to an end when there was an assignment of the lease by him to defendant 2 under the two documents Exhibits B. 3 and B. 4. The Court below overruled that contention and made a decree against both the defendants. The petitioner before me is defendant 1 who questions the correctness of that decree.
(3.) The only argument addressed before me by Mr. Holla was that the privity of contract which existed between defendant 1 and the plaintiff in respect of the lease between them came to an end when there was a sale of the leased properties in favour of defendant 2. He submission was two-fold. The first was that in law a lessee between whom and the lessor them is a privity of contract has the liberty to terminate that privity of contract and end it by an unilateral act such as the assignment of the lease. The second submission was that the omission on the part of the plaintiff to send any reply to the notice sent to His Majesty on March 5, 1959 amounted to the recognition of the substitution of defendant 2 as lessee in place of defendant 1.