SHAMALA NAIDU AND ORS. Vs. SUNANDA BAI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) HEARD the learned counsel for the appellants regarding I.A. No. 1/2014 filed under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act. Perused the records.

(2.) A lady by name Sunanda Bai filed a suit in O.S. No. 149/1988 against Smt. Shamala Naidu and T.D. Nayagam @ Naidu. The said suit was decreed by a judgment and decree dated 22.11.1997 granting relief that plaintiff is the owner in possession of the suit schedule property and restraining the defendants and their men, agents etc. from interfering with the plaintiffs peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, defendant Nos. 1 and 2 have preferred appeal before the Additional District Judge and Presiding Officer (Fast Track Court -IV), Raichur, in R.A. No. 80/2004. By that time, it appears, second defendant died and his legal representatives were brought on record as appellant Nos. 2(A) to 2(D). The appeal was contested by the plaintiff. The first appellate Court on considering the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court in detail and re -appreciating the materials on record, dismissed the appeal vide judgment dated 30.10.2004 confirming the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court in O.S. No. 149/1988. Though the judgment and decree was passed by the first appellate Court on 30.10.2004, the present regular second appeal was filed on 02.01.2014 after lapse of 3258 days with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It is the fundamental basic principle of civil jurisprudence that parties have to show sufficient cause reasonably explaining the delay in preferring the appeal. The explanation given by the party who prefers the appeal in a delayed manner has to satisfy the requirement of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Further, if the delay is reasonable and the cause shown was sufficient and acceptable by the Courts, then the Court can exercise its discretion and condone such delay. If the delay is unreasonable, though some cause is shown, the Court has to very meticulously look into the cause shown and satisfy itself whether those causes are in the ordinary course are sufficient to condone the delay. It is for the simple reason that the delay caused in preferring the appeal and by virtue of the decree granted by the Trial Court and the first appellate Court some right is vested in favour of the opposite party and unnecessarily party should not be dragged on to the Court for the misconduct of the party who prefers the appeal with an unreasonable delay. With this background, let me see the affidavit filed in support of the application, whether the reasons given by the appellants in preferring the appeal are satisfactory.

(3.) LOOKING to the above said fact and circumstances, no one can imagine or come to conclusion that because of the unawareness of the legal proceedings, the appellants could not file this regular second appeal in time before this Court. Therefore, in my opinion, reasons shown are not sufficient moreover, the delay is not reasonable. There is delay of 3258 days which can be safely concluded that it is an unreasonable delay which is not properly explained. Hence, I.A. No. 1/2014 deserves to be dismissed with costs. Consequently, the appeal also liable to be dismissed.