VIDYAVARDHAKA SANGHA Vs. S K JOSHI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THESE two writ appeals arise out of the common judgment of the learned Single Judge in S. K. Joshi and Another v Vidyavardhaka sangh, Bijapur and Others. Hence, both the writ appeals were clubbed and heard together and they are being disposed of by this common judgment. These writ appeals are preferred by the management of the vidyavardhaka Sangha, a society registered under the Societies registration Act, 1860 and it runs several educational institutions in different parts of the State. The respondents in these two writ appeals, namely, M/s. Y. D. Deshpande and S. K. Joshi were appointed as assistant Teachers to serve in the V. B. Darbar Pre-University College situate in Station Road, Bijapur in the years 1991 and 1992 respectively on purely temporary basis and subject to the approval of the government. V. B. Darbar Pre-University College is an aided educational institution. The management sent up a proposal to the concerned governmental authorities on 20-8-1992 to accord permission to the appointment of these two teachers and to extend grant-in-aid to the post held by them. Quite curiously, the concerned governmental authority sat on the proposal sent up by the management for a long period and only on 1-3-1996, it rejected the proposal. Notwithstanding the refusal of the governmental authority to accord permission sought by the management and to extend grant-in-aid to the post held by these two teachers, their services were continued. Then came the impugned order dated 31-1-2001 terminating their services on the ground that their services are no longer required in the institution. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the management terminating their services, Writ petition Nos. 5761 and 5763 of 2001 were filed in this Court. In the writ petitions, it was contended that the action of the management was not bona fide but mala fide. In support of that plea, it was averred that the writ petitioners were paid consolidated monthly salary of Rs. 500/-initially which was enhanced to Rs. 1,000/- subsequently, though they have been discharging similar duties and functions attached to the post of regular teachers and, therefore, they made repeated representations and requests to the management to regularise their services and to pay them on par with the regular teachers. Since, there was no positive response from the management, they were constrained to issue legal notice dated 1st January, 2001 and irked by that action, the management terminated their services with mala fide intention. The writ petitions were opposed by the management by filing statement of objections. At the threshold, it was contended by the management that the writ petitions are not maintainable and that the writ petitioners have alternative remedy under Section 131 of the Karnataka Education act, 1983 (for short, 'the Act' ). It was also contended that the impugned orders are termination simpliciter and such a course was adopted by the management for the reason that the Government refused to accord permission to the appointments of the writ petitioners and to extend grant-in-aid to the posts held by them. Learned Single Judge in the premise of the pleadings and the case-law referred to by him came to the conclusion that though the impugned orders looked like termination simpliciter, they are actually passed by way of punishment, since the writ petitioners were demanding the management to regularise their services and to pay salary on par with the regularly employed teachers. The learned Single Judge has also opined that the termination of the services of the writ petitioners is even otherwise violative of principles of natural justice. So opining, the learned Judge has allowed the writ petitions and quashed the impugned orders dated 31-1-2001 passed by the management terminating the services of the writ petitioners and issued a direction to the management to reinstate the writ petitioners into service forthwith. The learned Judge has also held that the writ petitioners are entitled to monetary benefits from the date of termination of their services till the date of their reinstatement into service. While so holding and directing, the learned Judge, however, has reserved liberty to the management, if it so desires, to terminate the services of the writ petitioners in accordance with law. Hence, these writ appeals by the aggrieved management.

(2.) WE have heard Sri T. N. Raghupathy, learned Counsel for the management, Sri Prabhuling K Navadgi, learned Counsel for the respondent-teachers and Sri P. Prakash Shetty, learned Government advocate. Sri Raghupathy, learned Counsel, would reiterate the very same contentions which were advanced before the learned Single Judge on behalf of the management. In addition, Sri Raghupathy, would draw our attention to the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in paragraph 32 of the judgment that the termination of the services of the writ petitioners is not bona fide and would contend that such a factual finding is recorded by the learned Single Judge as if this Court is a fact-finding body and that too without giving any opportunity to the management to have its say in the matter. Per contra, Sri Prabhuling K navadgi would support the order of the learned Single Judge and submit that the order of the learned Single Judge is unexceptionable in the facts and circumstances of the case.

(3.) HAVING heard the learned Counsels for the parties, the following two questions arise for our consideration and decision: (i) Whether the writ petitions filed by the contesting respondents herein are maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution? and (ii) Whether any ground is made out by the management for us to step in and correct the judgment of the learned Single judge?