H S ACHUTHA Vs. CHIEF ENGINEER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner was at the relevant time Assistant Security Guard working at Malali village, Chakranagar Post in Shimoga District. He was served with a memo directing his suspension pending initiation of disciplinary proceedings against him for his involvement in the theft of Corrugated Galvanized Iron sheets of the Karnataka Power Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation) That suspension was followed by a charge sheet dated 17-10-1981 calling upon him to explain. Thereafter, a formal memo of charges was issued by the Enquiry Officer. Then the Enquiry Officer was changed and a new Enquiry Officer appointed on the objections raised by the petitioner. The enquiry was conducted. The petitioner was found guilty and his disciplinary authority, namely, the Chief Engineer-Corporation, the 1st respondent herein, dismissed the petitioner from service as per order dated 2-9-1982 which is impugned in this writ petition. It is needless to notice several of the contentions urged by the petitioner and the respondents. However, it will be useful to extract a paragraph from the statement of facts urged for the petitioner.

(2.) In addition to the above, the learned Counsel for the respondent Corporation has raised several preliminary objections for the maintainability of the petition. They are, that he has an alternative remedy under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) being a workman answering to the description as defined in that Act and therefore this Court should not entertain the writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. He has pi iced reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of Hariba v KS.R.T.C. (1983(1) Karnataka Law Journal, 261).

(3.) It will be proper for me to deal with the preliminary objection the first before I deal with the contentions for the petitioner. Undoubtedly, the learned single Judge of this Court in Hariba's case did come to the conclusion that Sec. 10 of the Act provides an adequate alternative efficacious remedy more appropriate for redressal in the case of wrongful dismissal in an industrial establishment. But I do not think, on a perusal of that judgment, the learned Judge has laid down an inflexible rule by which this Court is rendered powerless to interfere under Art. 226 of the Constitution where alternative remedy exists. The Constitution itself does not impose any fetter on the exercise of that jurisdiction. The rule is a Judge made Rule for the convenience of all concerned. The Courts exercising jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution are reluctant to examine matters which would involve investigation of facts which is better done in the appropriate forum, if statutory remedy is prescribed. This Court or the High Courts in India do give relief when there is initial lack of jurisdiction notwithstanding the existence of efficacious alternative remedy. I do not therefore propose to accept the contention of the learned Counsel appearing for the Corporation that Hariba's case lays down an inflexible rule in any way fettering this Court's jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution