(1.) The petitioners in these writ petitions have questioned the validity of some of the provisions of the Mysore Land Reforms Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act), as amended by Act 1 of 1974 in so far as it reduces the extent of land which a family can possess from what it was under Section 63 of the Act as it was originally enacted. It is also contended that the compensation fixed by the Legislature in respect of the surplus Land which would be taken away from the family is illusory. In support of these writ petitions, Sri T. Venkanna, learned counsel for the petitioners, raised the following contentions.
(2.) Two of the petitioners in these petitions are women. The definition of the expression 'family' includes the husband, the wife and minor sons and unmarried daughters. Section 63 treats the family as a unit for purposes of determining the ceiling. It is no doubt true that under Sub-section (3) of Section 63, the extent of land owned by a woman as stridhana property has to be taken into account in order to determine the maximum extent of land which a family can hold. Merely because the land belonging to a woman has also to be taken into consideration in order to determine the total extent of lend which a family can possess, it cannot be said that the provisions are opposed to Article 15 of the Constitution. It is seen that the other members of the family who may also own lands are also dealt with in the same way in which the woman whose stridhana property is taken into consideration. Hence, it cannot be said that there has been any discrimination against woman on the ground of sex because both males and females who constitute a family are dealt with alike. It is also seen that in so far as woman is concerned, presumably having in view Clause (3) of Article 15 of the Constitution, the Legislature has stated that in so far as the stridhana land is concerned that the extent of stridhana to be surrendered should in no case be more than the proportion which the extent of stridhana land bears to the. extent of the other land held by the family, in Section 67 (1-A) of the Act. Instead of discriminating against woman on the ground of sex, it has to be observed that the Legislature has tried to show a favour in favour of a woman in the instant case because a similar concession which is available in the case of stridhana of a woman, is not available in the case of a property owned by a minor son who also happens to be a member of the family.
(3.) The next contention relates to the absence of the assent of the President to the Act. It is argued that since the President had withheld his assent at one stage, he could not have given assent to the Bill at a later stage. When a similar contention was raised on an earlier occasion in Shama Rao v. State of Karnataka, Writ Petn. No. 1713 of 1974 decided on 27-5-1974 (Mys.), I rejected it on the ground that the material placed before the Court is not sufficient to come to the conclusion that the President had withheld his assent to the Bill. The allegations made in these petitions are in no way different from the allegations which were made in Shama Rao's case. Hence, there is no merit in this contention.