LAWS(KAR)-2014-4-110

H.R. JAGADISH Vs. SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER

Decided On April 30, 2014
H.R. Jagadish Appellant
V/S
SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The appellants, original petitioners, have sought to challenge the order dated 21-11-2013 of learned Single Judge of this Court, whereby the challenge to acquisition of their lands was spurned and the petitions were dismissed. The relevant facts in brief are that, the appellants claimed to be in possession of several parcels of land of Kolipura Village, Doddaballapura Taluk, Bangalore Rural District, which lands were stated to be virtually adjacent to a lake-cum-reservoir. The respondent-Karnataka Industrial Area Development Board ('KIADB' for short), issued notification dated 21-5-2007 for acquisition of some parts of the lands of the appellants for the proposed "Apparel Park". The appellants submitted their objections and ultimately, notification dated 27-4-2010 was issued under the provisions of Section 28(4) of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 ('KIAD Act' for short) in respect of five parcels of land, totally admeasuring 19 acres 16 guntas.

(2.) After considering the contentions of the appellants, mainly based on judgment of the Apex Court in Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board v C. Kenchappa and Others, 2006 AIR(SC) 2038 , it was held in the impugned order that mere declaration of an industrial area by the State, by itself, will not take away the requirement of obtaining change of land use, which is contemplated under other statutes and, therefore, the declaration of an industrial area is always subject to the statutory authorities under other legislation permitting the establishment of industry in a particular area..

(3.) Learned Counsel for the appellants vehemently argued and reiterated that, in view of the observations made by the Apex Court in C. Kenchappa's case, KIADB was required to take into consideration the environmental impact of declaring certain area as an industrial area under the provisions of Section 3 of the KIAD Act. On that basis, it was further argued that, in the facts of the present case, even as the other objections of the appellants were supposed to have been considered, the KIADB appears to have ignored the aforesaid observations, which were binding. He emphasised the relevant observations made by the Apex Court in paragraph 97 of C. Kenchappa's case as under: