LAWS(KAR)-1993-10-25

STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs. MOHAMMED ILLYAS

Decided On October 04, 1993
STATE OF KARNATAKA Appellant
V/S
MOHAMMED ILLYAS Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These writ appeals and writ petitions project a common question centering round the powers of the authorities functioning under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in so far as they seek to compound the offences under Section 127-B of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 analogous to Section 200 of the 1988 Act. They further project a question as to under what circumstances the concerned motor vehicles plying under tourist vehicle permits issued under the aforesaid Acts can be seized and detained by those authorities in exercise of their powers under Section 129-B of the 1939 Act or under Section 207 of the 1988 Act. Writ Appeals 1132-1183 of 1993 are taken out by the State of Karnataka being aggrieved by the common judgment rendered by Swami, J., (as he then was) in number of writ petitions. This judgment of Swami, J., is reported in the case of Mohammed Illyas and Others v Union of India and Others. W.A. Nos. 1083-1127 of 1992 challenge another common order of Swami, J., dated 12-12-1990 in a batch of writ petitions following the decision in Mohammed Illyas case, (supra). While Writ Appeal Nos. 3050-3054 of 1991 are also filed by the State of Karnataka and authorities functioning under the Motor Vehicles Act being aggrieved by a common judgment rendered by Swami, J., in another batch of writ petitions decided on 21-9-1990 following the very same judgment in Mohammed Illyas' case. While writ petitions are filed by private operators plying tourist motor vehicles and who have felt aggrieved by the Notifications dated 13-11-1986 and 25-10-1990 issued by the State of Karnataka under Section 200 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. They have also challenged the validity of Section 200 of the Act as well as Rule 81-A of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989. The writ petitions have been referred to the Division Bench in view of the fact that identical questions were raised in the aforesaid writ appeals which were already pending before the Division Bench and that is how all these matters have been placed for final hearing before us.

(2.) In order to appreciate the main grievance poised by the respective parties in these proceedings, it will be profitable to have a look at a few introductory facts leading to these proceedings. The original writ petitioners are operators of tourist vehicles or stage carriages. They obtained such permits from the authorities functioning under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Earlier they had obtained such permits under the corresponding provisions of the Act of 1939. They sought for a declaration that provision of Section 200 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') and Rule 259(2) of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) are violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution and for getting them struck down. The original writ petitioners, operators of tourist vehicles have also sought for a declaration that the operation of the tourist vehicles for countrywide operation between one terminus in home State and another terminus in another State are not liable to be seized and detained on the basis of the Entry 16 of the Notification guiding No. FTD. 18 TMR 85, dated 13-11-1986 on the sole ground that the said tourist vehicles are operated as non-stop motor vehicles between any two points and carry in them passengers. They had also sought for quashing Entries Nos. 16 and 64 contained in that Notification. The original writ petitioners had also sought for appropriate directions to the authorities, which were functioning under the Motor Vehicles Act and who were joined as respondent Nos. 2 to 4 in the petitions and their subordinates to refund the compounding fee collected from the vehicle operators. They had also sought for quashing the check-reports issued on spot. One more declaration was sought for i.e., that Rule 259(2) of the rules was unconstitutional so far as it covers Section 200 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The aforesaid writ petitioners succeeded before Swami, J., who delivered the judgment reported in Mohammed Illyas', case (supra) and were granted reliefs as indicated therein. That has resulted in writ appeals filed by the State of Karnataka and authorities under the Motor Vehicles Act. While the remaining writ petitioners have prayed for identical reliefs bringing in challenge the second Notification of 1990 issued by the State of Karnataka under Section 200 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

(3.) According to the writ petitioners, the authorities functioning under the Act force persons in-charge of the motor vehicle which is plied as stage carriage or tourist vehicle to compound the offences on spot on the ground that the tourist vehicle is being run as a stage carriage in violation of the terms and the conditions of the permit or that the concerned motor vehicle is being run on a route not authorised by the permit, If they do not compound the offence, the vehicles are threatened to be seized and detained resulting in untold hardship to the operators of such motor vehicles and the passengers carried in them and consequently, Section 200 of the Act, under which they enforce such compounding of offence, is ultra vires the provisions of the Constitution and void. Swami, J., who heard these petitions, took the view that the compounding of offence as contemplated by Section 200 read with Rule 259(2) of the rules involves adjudication of the concerned offences by the authorities on spot and this provision would be unreasonable unless it is read down and accordingly, the learned Judge read down the provisions of Section 200. The learned Judge also took the view that the Notification No. FTD. 18 TMR. 85, dated 13-11-1986 issued under Section 200 involved a procedure which was oppressive in nature and therefore, it is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and was liable to be struck down. The learned Judge, as a consequence, also directed the authorities to refund the compounding fee, which might have been collected in exercise of powers under Section 200 read with the said Notification. As noted earlier, the aforesaid decision of Swami, J., has resulted in the appeals filed by the State of Karnataka and the officers functioning under the Motor Vehicles Act.