(1.) This regular second appeal is filed by the appellant who was the defendant in the Trial Court under Section 100 of C.P.C. against the judgment and decree dated 22-1-1980 passed by the Civil Judge, K.G.F., in R.A. No. 80 of 1979 confirming the judgment and decree dated 9-7-1979 passed by the Munsiff, K.G.F., in O.S. No. 209 of 1974.
(2.) I have heard the learned Counsel for the appellant and the learned Counsel for the respondent fully and perused the records of the case.
(3.) The respondent filed the suit for cancellation of the registered release deed dated 25-8-1973, the certified copy of which is at Ex. D-1 and for restraining the appellant from alienating the suit schedule property and from collecting rents of the suit schedule premises and costs, on the averment that the appellant is a close relative of the respondent and he was also acting as the Power of Attorney Holder of Sri B. Bhaskara Naidu who was the original owner of the schedule property and the respondent is a permanent resident of K.G.F. and that the appellant, i.e., the respondent in the Courts below offered his help in getting the sale deed effected and asked the respondent to execute a release deed nominally in his favour and subsequently tried to sell the property and that the respondent here only believing the representation agreed and executed the release deed nominally for a consideration of Rs. 1,000/-. The appellant filed his written statement contending that the release deed Ex. D-l is a genuine document and all the allegations made by the respondent against the appellant in respect of getting the deed executed are false, and on the basis of the contentions taken by him in the written statement, he prayed for the dismissal of the suit. The Trial Court decreed the suit of the respondent. The appellant was aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the Trial Court and hence he preferred R.A. No. 80 of 1979 in the Court of the Civil Judge, Kolar and the Civil Judge, Kolar, after hearing both sides dismissed the appeal confirming the judgment and decree of the Trial Court. The appellant being aggrieved by the judgments and decrees of both the Courts below, preferred this regular second appeal.