LAKSHMINARAYANA ADIGA Vs. TOWN MUNICIPAL COUNCIL HIRIYUR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This petition coming on for preliminary hearing after notice to respondents is disposed of by the following order after hearing counsel for parties.

(2.) Petitioner was the successful lessee who acquired leasehold right over certain buildings situated in Hiriyur town in the bus-stand belonging to the Town Municipal Council of Hiriyur which is the 1st respondent herein. At the auction held on 22-4-1982, in terms of the he deposited a sum of Rs. 63,000 being the rent of six months agreeing to pay monthly rental of Rs. 10,500 It was also one of the terms and conditions of the auction of the lease-hold that the the leasee should formally execute lease deed in accordance with law within a specified time. The petitioner has however, contended that he was ready and willing to do that at all times but due to supervening facts and circumstances was never permitted to execute that deed by Action of respondents-1 and 2 Town Municipal Council and its Chief Officer respectively.

(3.) However, the 2nd respondentChief Officer of the 1st respondent Town Municipal Council came to issue an order of attachment of moveables on 25-10-1982 against the petitioner's properties in the premises which he had taken on lease from the 'st respondent Town Municipal Council in which he was running a hotel at the bus-stand. A true copy of that notice is produced as Annexure-D to the petition, pursuant to that notice, the petitioner's belongings found in the premises were taken away forcibly despite his protests and he was prevented from carrying on business in the premises and he was locked out of the premises by the agents of the 1st and 2nd respondents, aggrieved by the same, the petitioner filed a suit in the Court of the Munsiff at Chitradurga and while that suit was pending he approached this Court also under Article 226 of the constitution for relief inter alia contending that the entire action of the 2nd respondent in ordering attachment on the alleged arrears of rent being due by the petitioner was high-handed and without the authority of law putting the petitioner to a great loss. In the course of hearing, of this writ petition when it was pointed out that the petitioner could not possibly maintain a suit and also this writ petition in this Court, the suit pending in the Court of the Munsiff was withdrawn as the petitioner considered that the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution would be more efficacious in the light he had been placed. The responndents have entered appearance and filed their statement of objections. In defence of their action, it is stated that the petitioner did not pay rents for a period five months from the date of lease and that the respondents were apprehensive that the petitioner was leaving the municipal limits in order to avoid payment of monthly dues under the lease and therefore, in exercise of the power conferred on the respondents by Section 148 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) cocrsive and emergent action was taken to attach the moveables. In regard to certain other details, there has been denial of the allegations that the respondents and their agents have acted high-handedly It is in the light of the facts and the contentions raised that this Court has to determine the only question that falls for determination and that is : Whether there was any justification legal or otherwise for the 2nd respondent to initiate action under Sec. 148 of the Act? Chapter-6 of the Act deals with Municipal taxation and provides for tax and procedure for levy. Chapter-7 of the Act deals with recovery of Municipal dues. Though at one stage Sri Balasubramanyam, learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that power of recovery under Section 148 is confined to recovery of dues in respect of taxes and fees levied under the Act and would not relate to the contractual obligations arising out of lease agreements and certainly would not include rent, when attention of the Court was drawn to the provisions made in 161 of the Act, that contention was not pressed. But he nevertheless contended that the action initiated by the 2nd respondent in ordering attachment under S. 148 of the Act was without the authority of law as he had no power under S, 154 of the Act. Therefore, it would be useful to examine the scope of S. 148 and S. 154 of the Act for that limited purpose. S. 154 of the Act reads as follows :