HAKKALAVELLI CHANNABASAPPA GOWDA Vs. V MALLAPPA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The respondents filed an application under S.42 of the Mysore Land Reforms Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for recovery of rent from the petitioners. The learned Additional Munsiff, Sagar made an order on the 28th of January, 1971 in favour of the respondents. Against that order, the petitioners preferred an appeal on the 20th of September, 1971 to the District Court at Shimoga under S.118 of the Act. The petitioners also filed an application I.A.No.I for condonation of delay in preferring the appeal in the Court of the District Judge. The learned District Judge dismissed I.A.No.I and consequently dismissed the appeal also as teing Lerred by limitation. Hence, this tevisoin petition.

(2.) Shri B. Veerabhadrappa, learned Counsel for the petitioner, contended that the learned District Judge committed an error of law in holding that the appeal filed by the petitioners ni the District Court is barred by limitation. S.122 of the Act which prescribes the period of limitation, reads as follows : " Limitation:- Every appeal under this Act shall be filed within a period of sixty days from the date of the order of the Court of the Deputy Commissioner or the Tahsildar or the Asst. Commr when the party or the legal practitioner appearing on his behalf is present at the time the order is pronounced, and in other cases within a period of sixty days from the date on which the order is communicated to the party by post. The provisions of S.4, 5, 12 and 14 of Limitation Act, 1963, shall be applicable to such appeal." It is clear from the S.122 of the Act that the period of limitation prescribed for preferring appeals against the orders of the Court is 60 days. But, there are two dates for the commencement of the said period of limitation. If the party or the legal practitioner appearing on his behalf is present at the time the order is pronounced, the period of 60 days shall commence from the date of pronouncement of the order. If, however, the party or his legal practitioner was not present at the time the order was pronounced, the period of 60 days shall commence from the date on which the order is communicated to the party by post. It may also be useful at this stage to advert to sub-sec. (3) of S.115 of the Act which prescribes that in every enquiry in which the parties are heard before orders are passed, the orders shall be pronounced in open Court after notice to the parties and the decision of the Court or the Deputy Commissioner or other officer, intimated to the parties concerned by post . Sub-sec. (3) of S.115 of the Act requires that in addition to pronouncement of the order in open Court, notice of the decision of the Court is also required to be intimated to the parties concerned by post.

(3.) Therefore, in every case where the question arises as to whether the appeal has been presented within the prescribed time, the appellate Court has necessarily to determine as to whether the party or his legal practitioner was present at the time of the pronouncement of the order and if the party or his legal practitioner was not present at the time of pronouncement of the order, to determine the date on which the order was communicated to the party by post. Such determination becomes necessary in view of the plain language of S. 122 of the Act.