SANNAHALAMMA Vs. STATE OF MYSORE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal under Sec.110D of the Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) read with Rule 363 of the Motor Vehicles Rules, 1963, is directed against the dismissal of a claim made! by the appellants herein under S.110A of Act. The claim arose on account of the fatal accident suffered by their only son on. 6-6-1964 on Circuit House Road in Shimoga Town. The appellants are the natural parents of the said boy who was unfortunately killed on the spot on account of the dashing of the lorry belonging to the Public Works Department of the Government of Mysore. During the pendency of the appeal, the father of the deceased boy, the second appellant herein, is reported dead by a memo filed today and it is also submitted therein that the first appellant is the only surviving heir entitled to prosecute the appeal.

(2.) The material facts are these: The deceased son of the appellants died on 6-6-1964 on account of the accident referred to above. It would appear that he is the only child of his parents. The petition claiming compensation was filed on 19-4-1965, and, therefore, was clearly beyond the period of limitation prescribed, which is sixty days from the date of the accident. Obviously, to get over this difficulty the claimants filed an application for condonation of delay in preferring the petition in accordance with the provisions of the proviso to S.110A(3) of the Act. This application was formally opposed on behalf of the respondents, the terms of the objection being confined to the following : The petition is clearly barred by time. The grounds for condoning the delay on the face of it is not sufficient and substantial It is, therefore, submitted that the delay in filing the application cannot be condoned.

(3.) The Tribunal after an examination of the grounds urged in support of the application for condonation of delay, refused to exercise its discretion in favour of the appellants and rejected the claim petition. Hence this appeal. After hearing the learned Counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that this a fit case where the discretion vested in the Tribunal ought to have been exercised in favour of the appellants, thus condoning the delay in the presentation of the petition. The proviso to S.110A(3) of the Act in question enjoins that the claims Tribunal could entertain a claim petition after the expiry of the period of sixty days if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented from sufficient cause from making the petition in time. It is fairly well settled that the phrase 'sufficient cause occurring in the said proviso should not receive a narrow construction treating it on a par with the provisions of S.5 of the Limitation Act. In the instant case the principal reason urged is that the parents were suffiering from shock on account of the death of their only child on account of the unfortunate accident. It is also seen from the affidavit of the second appellant that there is a reference to the criminal proceedings instituted against the driver of the vehicle involved in the accident and that he applied for certified copies of the proceedings therein only after his transfer to Sagar. This in our view, would clearly give rise to an inference that he must have done so on legal advice. What is more, there is also reference to the consultation with an Advocate before filing the petition. We are also inclined to think that the ground relative to the shock suffered by the parents on account of the death of their only child is not wholly irrelevant to the question at issue. Taking all these circumstances into consideration, we are of the view that this is a fit case where the delay in preferring the petition ought to have been condoned. The order of the Court below, is, therefore, clearly unsustainable.