M P Vs. MYSORE REVENUE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This petition is directed against an order made by the Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal in appeal No.555/1972. By that order the Tribunal rejected the appeal of the petitioner under S.49 of the Mysore Land Revenue Act, directed against an order made by the Tahsildar of Kolar Taluk, under S.94(3) of that Act.

(2.) The petitioner was served with a notice of eviction from a portion of the land in S.No.180, admeasuring 3 guntas in Vemagal village, by the Tahsildar, purporting to act under sub-sec. (3) of S.94 of the Land Revenue Act. It is no,t in dispute that the power exercisable under S.94 of the Act is one to be exercised by a Deputy Commr., unless the same has been delegated to any other authority in accordance with the provisions of S.195 of the Land Revenue Act. It is also conceded that there is in fact such a notification, issued by the Government, delegating the power exercisable by a Deputy Commissioner under S.94(3), to the Tahsildar. Indeed, it is pointed out that the notification is S.O.4784 dt.17-6-1966.. Aggrieved by the said notice, the petitioner had approached the Revenue Appellate Tribunal in appeal under S.49 of the Land Revenue Act, which was dismissed as not maintainable. Hence this petition.

(3.) The question that arises for consideration is whether any order made by a Tahsildar in exercise of the powers of a Deputy Commissioner under S.94(3) of the Land Revenue Act, by virtue of the delegation of such power under S.195 of that Act, can be equated to the order of the Deputy Commissioner himself for the purposes of an appeal under S.49 of the Act. This question is best anwered by a reference to the enunciation by the Supreme Court, following a decision in (1890) 25 QBD. 391), in Roop Chand v. State of Punjab, AIR. 1963 SC. 1503. The relevant enunciation occurs in paragraph 11 of the said report and reads thus : " The question then arises, when the Government delegates its power for example, to entertain and decide an appeal under S.21(3), to an officer and the officer pursuant to such delegation hears the appeal and makes an order, is the order an order of the officer or of the Government? We think it must be the order of the Government. Tile order is made under a statutory power. It is the statute which creates that power. The power can, therefore, be exercised only in terms of the statute and not otherwise. In this case the power is created by S.21(4). That section gives a power to the Government. It would follow that an order made in exercise of that power will bq the order of the Government for no one e]se has the right under the statute to exercise the power. No doubt the Act enables the Government to delegate its power but such a power when delegated remains the power of the Government for the Government can only delegate the power given to it by the statute and cannot create an independent power in the officer. When the delegatee exercises the power, he does so for the Government. It is of interest to observe here that Wills J. said in Huth v. Clarke (1890) 25 QBD. 391 that : "the word delegate means little more than an agent." An agent of course exercises no powers of his own but only the powers of his principal. Therefore, an order passed by an officer on delegation on him under Section 41(1) of the power of the Government under Sec.21(4), is for the purposes of the Act, an order of the Government. If it were not so and it were to be held that the order had been made by the officer himself and was not an order of the Government and of course it had to be one or the other- then we would have an order made by a person on whom the Act did not confer any power to make it. That would be an impossible situation."