LAWS(KAR)-1963-2-1

BHEEMA RAO Vs. V RAO

Decided On February 07, 1963
BHEEMA RAO Appellant
V/S
V Rao Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE appellant filed a criminal complaint against the respondent who is a practising lawyer at Bhalki in Bidar District for an offence punishable under Section 504 of the Indian Penal Code. The case, made out in the complaint is that when the complainant was being cross -examined in Civil Case No. 16/1 of 1959 in the Court of the Munsif, the accused used filthy words with the intention of insulting him and that though he felt very much annoyed he was helpless as he had to observe complete silence in order to maintain, the dignity of the Court. After retarding evidence as in a warrant case the Magistrate framed a charge under Section 504 of the Indian Penal Code and completed the trial according to law. During the course of his examination under Section 342, Cr. P.C. the accused was questioned about the insulting language used by him against the complainant but he replied that he could not say what he had then said as he had been provoked by the complainant so be to affect his prestige. He adduced no evidence to support his defence.

(2.) ON considering the evidence the Magistrate, held that the words used by the accused were derogatory to the dignity of the person to whom they were addressed x x x x x particularly when they had been uttered by a legal practitioner but that the accused was entitled to the benefit of Section 95 of the Indian Penal Code as the words were commonly used in everyday life without any meaning or sting. He relied upon the decision of the Bombay High Court in Philip Rangel v. Emperor, AIR 1932 Bom 193 and acquitted the accused.

(3.) THERE is no difficulty in this case in determining the precise words used by the accused which have been recorded immediately by the Munsiff at the end of the complainant's deposition. The words are "Theri chup, Maki Lowda" and they, mean "You shut up; mother male Organ". It cannot be doubted that these words uttered by the accused are an intentional insult to the complainant and are sufficient under normal circumstances to provoke a normal person to break the public peace. The contention advanced on behalf of the accused that the words were more defamatory than, an intentional insult has no substance. Defamation under the Penal Code consists in the making or publication of any imputation concerning any person, intending to harm the reputation of such person. The term 'imputation' implies an allegation of a fact and not merely a term of abuse which may amount to an insult. It consists in the making of an expression, allegation or insinuation against a person so as to affect his reputation.In the present case the words used are filthy and indicate the accused's intention to insult that complainant thus exhibiting disrespect or indignity towards the complainant's mother. Such terms of abuse wherein mention is made of mother along with the male organ are provocative in the extreme and the accused who is a practising lawyer cannot be heard to say that he had no intention to insult the complainant by the use of those expressions. Even during the course of his statement under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure he simply avoided to explain by stating that he could not say what expressions he had used against the complainant as he himself had been provoked.Our attention was drawn to two statements at Exs. D -1 and D -2 made by the complainant during the course of his deposition as provoking the accused. The first statement is that there was enmity between the complainant and the accused since four years and that Gourawwa had involved the complainant in the case on the advice of the accused. The second statement is that Gourawwa respected the advice of the accused and that she therefore involved the complainant in the suit falsely. These averments made in the examination -in -chief cannot be regarded as provocative. It was further argued that at the stage of the cross -examination when the alleged insulting expressions are said to have been used, the complainant said that the accused had come from Manthal and made property. We are unable to see how these expressions could be provocative. Even if it were a fact that the replies given by the complainant which were definitely not abusive provoked the accused that circumstance cannot be used to justify the use of such filthy language in open court by a lawyer. The Magistrate's observation that the filthy words used by the accused were quite common and meant no offence is neither based on any evidence nor on any statement by the accused. We are convinced that the accused used the filthy expressions with an intention to insult the complainant while he was in the witness box.