PRAFULLA Vs. BHARAMAPPA, SHRI BHUPAL AND SHRI BABU

JUDGEMENT

(1.) HEARD the learned counsel for the appellant. The appellant was the complainant alleging offences punishable under Sections 427, 447, 504, 506(2) read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as 'I.P.C.', for brevity). The complainant is said to be the owner of land bearing Sy. Nos. 252/1/1, 252/2/2, 253/2 and 254/1/2 all of Terdal village. These lands are in a compact area. Towards the north of these lands, there is a 'nala' and beyond the 'nala', lies the lands belonging to the accused. It is alleged that the accused had crossed the 'nala' and chopped down trees on the bank abutting the lands of the complainant, thereby blocking the 'nala' and allowing water to flow on to the land of the complainant, thereby causing damage. In this regard, the complainant had filed a suit for injunction in O.S. No. 38/1981, which was dismissed, against which an appeal was filed in R.A. No. 29/1981 and the same was allowed. The accused had in turn challenged the same by way of R.S.A. No. 116/1998 on its appellate side and the same was dismissed by a judgment of this court dated 27.03.2002. However, on 12.08.2003, the accused are said to have trespassed on to the land of the complainant as aforesaid, and caused damage as aforesaid, which is estimated at Rs. 1,00,000/ - and it is in this background that the complainant had approached the court below alleging "that apart from causing such damage, accused had abused him and had made little of the binding judgments of this court by telling the complainant, "court order kisiyaagi ittukondu thiragaada magane, ninnannu badidhu kolluthene" and accordingly, had caused damage to the land of the appellant. On issuance of process, the accused had appeared and had pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. Charges having been framed, the court below had framed the following points for consideration: (1) Whether the complainant proves beyond all reasonable doubts that the accused Nos. 1, 2 and 4 by violating order of the court on 12 -8 -2003 at 9.30 a.m. with their common intention trespassed into the land of the complainant and cut the trees and bund and changed the flow of Ajanal nala in to land of complainant and thereby the accused caused loss to the tune of Rs. 1,00,000/ - to the complainant and the accused by committing above said acts committed the offences punishable under Sections 427, 447 read with Section 34 of the IPC? (2) Further whether the complainant proves beyond all reasonable doubts that on 12 -8 -2003 at 9.30 a.m. when the complainant resisted the illegal acts of the accused, the accused Nos. 1, 2 and 4 abused the complainant in filthy language knowingly that it will cause provocation to the complainant to break the public peace and put the life threat to the complainant and thereby the accused committed the offences punishable under Sections 504 and 506(2) read with Section 34 of the IPC? (3) What order? The court below held the points in the negative and acquitted the accused. It is that which is under challenge in the present appeal.

(2.) FROM the judgment of the Trial Court, it is evident that there were several inconsistencies as between the allegations in the complaint and the evidence of the complainant at the trial. It is these discrepancies and inconsistencies which have been discussed at length and the court below has opined that the veracity of the complaint is doubtful. In any event, the judgments of the Civil Court having attained finality, there was clearly a permanent injunction in favour of the complainant and therefore, he had adequate remedy of enforcing the same and therefore, no prejudice would be caused if the appellant was acquitted insofar as the complaint was concerned and has accordingly acquitted the accused. Therefore, the several grounds raised in the appeal which are canvassed by the learned counsel for the appellant would not advance the case of the appellant. The appellant having the benefit of decree of permanent injunction and the same being in perpetuity insofar as the suit properties are concerned, the appellant is adequately protected from any further interference and therefore, the dismissal of the criminal case does not take away any further remedies available to the appellant in respect of any further interference with his property. Therefore, in the light of the infirmities and inconsistencies which have been highlighted by the court below, there is no warrant for interference. The appeal stands dismissed.