H.C. ANJANEYA Vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an appeal against conviction for offences punishable under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The case of the prosecution was that the accused who was working as a Superintendent, Karnataka Government Insurance Department, Mysore, had demanded a bribe of Rs. 300/ - from the complainant, one J. Jayaram, a Group -D employee working in the Maharam Women's College, in order to do an official act, namely, to recommend the sanctioning of the maximum permissible loan under the policy of the Department. It transpires the complainant had made an application in this regard. On the demand for illegal gratification, the complainant had approached the Lokayukta Police on 8.1.1998 and lodged a complaint in this regard. After having registered a case, the Police had made elaborate preparations of securing two panch witnesses and after going through the drill of preparing for a trap and drawing up a mahazar as regards the tainting of currency notes with phenolphthalein powder and instructing the complainant and the shadow witness of the manner in which the trap would be carried out, the entire team, consisting of the complainant, the witnesses and the Police having proceeded to the work place of the accused, the complainant and the shadow witness are said to have met the accused and when the demand was made for the bribe amount, the tainted currency notes having been handed over and immediately thereafter, the waiting police are said to have swooped on the accused, on a signal from the complainant and apprehended the accused and then had gone through the exercise of washing the hands of the accused in sodium carbonate solution to establish that he had handled the tainted currency notes. The currency notes also having been recovered from the accused, the Police after having drawn up a mahazar of the seizure, further steps were taken and the accused was ultimately charge sheeted. The trial court having framed the charges against the accused, he had pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. The prosecution had then examined four witnesses and marked twelve documents and eleven material objects. The statement of the accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Hereinafter referred to as the 'Cr.P.C., for brevity), was recorded and after hearing the prosecution and the accused, had found the appellant guilty and had convicted the appellant imposing the punishment of simple imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/ - for the offence punishable under Section 7 of the PC Act and to undergo simple imprisonment for two years and to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/ - insofar as the offence punishable under Sections 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act. It is that which is under challenge in this appeal.

(2.) THE learned Senior Advocate, Shri C.H. Jadhav, appearing for the counsel for the appellant would contend that the judgment of the court below would need to be set aside for the following among other reasons. That the trial could not have accepted the evidence of PW -2, the complainant, to the effect that he met the appellant several times from 7.12.1997 onwards with regard to his pending application When the said statement could not be reconciled with his further statement in the course of cross -examination that it was for the first time that he had met the appellant on 27.12.1997. It was also pertinent that the trial court had ignored yet another curious admitted circumstance. In that, the complainant had categorically state that he had submitted a hand written complaint and thereafter a -type written complaint, marked as Ex. P.4, in the absence of the handwritten complaint being produced before the court, and if the same was the basis on which the trap was conducted followed by the prosecution, the entire proceedings are vitiated. It is contended that the written explanation of the appellant having been admitted in evidence, the same is hit by Section 162 of the Cr.P.C., and the trial court could not have held against the appellant on that basis. It is also contended that the trial court was not justified in treating a question posed in cross -examination as a suggestion as seen from paragraph 13 of the judgment, and on that premise to treat the answer given by PW -2 as an admission made by the appellant. This reasoning is directly in conflict with the ratio of a decision of a Division bench of this court in the case of Parameshwari Bai v. Muthoji Rao Scindia AIR 1981 Karnataka 10. It is contended that the court below was not justified in concluding that the appellant was holding the file Ex. P.2, on the date of the trap, merely because he had handed over the same to the police after the trap. In this context the trial court has rejected his written explanation, Ex. P.6, wherein he had stated that he had sent the file to the District Insurance Officer for issuance of cheque on 29.12.1997 itself - while at the same time the very same Ex. P6 is relied upon in respect of other statements to negate the case of the appellant. It is contended that there was no independent evidence to hold that the appellant had continued possession of the file Ex P -2. The non -examination of the case worker, Smt. Sowbagya and the District Insurance Officer, whose evidence would have enabled the court to arrive at a definite conclusion. It is contended that the court has not appreciated the circumstance that, the appellant had been exonerated of the very charges in a domestic enquiry and that the same had attained finality. The law in this regard as laid down in A.A. Rajya v. State of Bihar, 1996 (2) Cri 234, V.B. Raikar Vs. State of Karnataka, (2004) CriLJ 333 and in Radheshyam Kejriwal Vs. State of West Bengal and Another, (2011) CriLJ 1747 . It was also to be noticed that the witnesses examined at the domestic enquiry and the witnesses examined at the trial had given completely different versions which is glossed over by the trial court. The learned Senior Advocate would contend that in view of the above infirmities, the appellant ought to be acquitted, as the prosecution could not be said to have established the case beyond all reasonable doubt.