(1.) WE have heard the learned Addl. SPP on behalf of the appellant-State both on I. A. I as also on merits. Since after examining the merits we are not satisfied that this is a case in which the appeal deserves to be admitted we have refrained from issuing notice to the respondents. However, on an independent consideration we accept the explanation for the delay of 8 days, we allow the IA. 1 and condone the delay.
(2.) COMING to the merits of the case, despite the fact that some injuries have been caused the trial court has acquitted the accused and the familiar reasoning that has been recorded is that there was a virtual nee fight on the spot, that the injuries have been caused on both sides and that therefore, it would be virtually impossible for the court to hold as to who was the aggressor and as to who was the victim. In view of this position, the court has acquitted the accused and, on a reconsideration of the record we are virtually rendered helpless in so far as it is again difficult for us on this material to conclusively hold that the order of acquittal was unjustified. We do confess however that we have been considerably handicapped in the hearing of this and every other identical case, because of the fact that for some strange reason the trial courts have been following the wrong practice of taking up the case and cross-case at different points of time and disposing of the same through the judgments delivered at different times. More importantly, even after careful scrutiny we find it impossible to ascertain as to what has been the fate of the cross-case though we reasonably assume that if the accused have been acquitted in this case that the accused would in all likelihood have been acquitted in the cross-case.
(3.) IN order to conserve judicial time and from the point of view of expediency the trial courts had been directed to ensure that whenever there is a case and cross-case in respect of the same incident that the cases must be heard together. Normally, the cases would be disposed off through a common judgment but if there are reasons that the judgments will have to be separately delivered it is the discretion of the trial court though we insist that this should be done at the same point of time and secondly, that if two judgments are delivered then a clear indication will have to be set out as to what is the fate of the cross-case in each order.