(1.) AN interesting facet of the law relating to an acceptability of dying declarations particularly when applied to wife burning cases has fallen for determination in this appeal.
(2.) THE Respondent before us who was the original accused is the husband of Smt. Suvarna who is the unfortunate victim in the burning incident. On the afternoon of 11-6-1996, Smt. Suvarna was severely burnt as a result of her clothes having been set on fire and she was taken to a private hospital with 61% burns and having regard to the seriousness of her condition, she was thereafter shifted to the Government Hospital at Sangli. On the evening of the same day, the police recorded her statement in the form of a complaint which is Ex. P-9 and in this complaint, she has implicated the husband as being the person who poured kerosene on her clothes and set them on fire. According to her, she was sleeping after having had her afternoon meal and that she suddenly woke up because she found her clothes were wet and that she saw her husband light a match-stick and having lit her clothes. Later that night, a formal dying declaration has been recorded which is Ex. P-13. In this dying declaration, Suvarna has elaborated the circumstances under which she was burnt by stating that there was a violent argument between her husband who is the accused and herself over the fact that she had gone to her parents' place and that this culminated in his throwing kerosene on her clothes and setting them on fire. In both the complaint and in the dying declaration, the accused-husband has been implicated. Apart from this evidence, there is virtually zero evidence on record because the entire string of witnesses who have deposed before the Court have effectively stated that they do not know under what circumstances, the incident took place and secondly, that the relations between the husband and the wife were cordial. Strangely enough, when it came to her own parents, we still have similar evidence on record viz., that they were not aware of any disagreement or hostility between the husband and the wife at any time. The entire record of the prosecution case, therefore, rests on the two documents viz., the complaint and the dying declaration and the learned trial Judge for a variety of reasons that have been set out by him has come to the conclusion that the charge under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code cannot be sustained on the basis of this material and has, therefore, acquitted the accused. The State has assailed the correctness of this decision through the present appeal.
(3.) THE record of this case is reasonably modest and the two learned counsel have not only referred to different parts of it but have also taken us thread-bare through the whole of this record. As indicated by us earlier, the prosecution case either succeeds or fails entirely on the basis of the two documents referred to by us earlier.