STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs. JAGAPPA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) WE have heard the learned Addl. SPP on merits in this appeal. Though there is IA-I for condonation of delay of 31 days, normally, the Court would have issued notice to respondent on IA-I and then taken up the main appeal for consideration, we have for the reasons set out below, examined the appeal on merits because one of the predominant factors which weighs with the Court while condoning the delay is the question as to how very strong and sustainable the appeal is on merits. In a case where it does appear to the Court that the appeal is very valid and that prlma facie interference with the order of acquittal is necessary because there appears to be enough material to sustain a conviction, merely because there is some delay, the Court would not refuse to condone the delay. We are, out of a sense of responsibility required to reverse the position insofar as if the appeal appears to be weak on merits and if there appears to be virtually no grounds on which the order of acquittal could be replaced by an order of conviction, then, in our considered view the issuance of notice to the respondent accused would not be in consonance with the interests of justice. It is because the Court while examining the facts of the case cannot overlook the status of the accused, who in this case happen to be villagers who do not have sufficient resources even to contest the application for condonation of delay, even to subject them to one or two hearings before the High Court would be burdensome and therefore, it is a heavy duty cast upon the Court to examine the aspect of delay along with merits of the case before issue of notice.

(2.) THE learned Addl. SPP, in support of the appeal has pointed out to us that there is very clear evidence of PWs 1 to 4, who claim to be eye witnesses to the incident. The witnesses are PWs 1 and 2 who allege that the respondents 1 and 2 to this appeal had incidentally caught hold of the deceased and they were grappling with him and that it was the juvenile accused, who has been tried separately, who inflicted the injuries with a stone, as a result of which the death took place.

(3.) THE learned trial Judge has rightly applied the law while weighing this evidence insofar as he holds that admittedly the injuries had not been caused by these accused. What would be left us to see is, therefore, the question as to whether if it is held that they were participating in the incident, the present accused could be held guilty under Section 34 or 109, IPC.