STATE Vs. MAHABOOBALI ALIAS MAHABOOB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) WE have heard the learned Addl. SPP on merits. First of all, the submission is that in a serious case of rioting and causing injury, invoking a charge under Section 307, IPC, is, attempt to murder, that the conviction is only under Section 324 r/w 149, IPC and that the trial Court has invoked the provisions of Section 4 of Probation of Offenders Act and let off the accused with a warning. Prima facie, the case did require reconsideration, but having regard to the status of the accused, we have decided to ascertain as to whether the evidence on record would justify a variation of the order before issuing notice.

(2.) AFTER hearing the learned counsel on merits, what we find is that even though the charge framed were serious the trial Court was fully justified in recording a conviction only under Section 324, IPC because the injury was minor. The learned Addl. SPP submitted that the consequence could have been grave, because a deadly weapon was used. In our considered view, the nature and gravity of the injury would certainly not justify a conviction under any more serious Sections of the IPC. The trial Court has exercised its discretion while invoking the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, because the accused were in custody for varying periods of time, but more importantly, because they come from an extremely poor strata of society and the Court has taken a view that if they are sentenced to jail, it would only cause very severe injuries to the accused. We see no ground on which we can differ from that conclusion despite the vehement submission canvassed by the learned counsel who represents appellant State.

(3.) THE additional reason, why we decline to interfere is because technically, the Probation of Offenders Act has been specifically promulgated to take care of that specific class of accused, wherein even if a conviction has been established, if the interests of justice so requires, the Court can refrain from imposing fine or sentence. The submission canvassed before us is that the discretion was wrongly exercised because the offences are very serious ones and that it would create a wrong impression in the public mind that despite having been convicted the accused are not punished. We have considered this argument and what we need to observe is that the theory of punishments prescribes that, where a deterrent sentence is to be awarded or where the conviction justifies retributive punishment, what is required to be established in those instances is that the damage or injury is sufficiently grave. The other principle, which we have to bear in mind is that the High Courts and Apex Court, in the recent past, have repeatedly taken cognizance of the status of the accused while deciding on the nature and gravity of the sentence and in a case of the present type where the accused are initially arrested and were in custody for some period before they were released and where the trial itself has taken something like five years, the Courts often take note of the fact that this trauma alone is more than sufficient punishment for the accused. Having regard to all these principles, we see no ground for interference. The appeal, accordingly, fails on merits and stands dismissed. Appeal dismissed.