PUTTARAJE URS Vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE learned Special Judge, Mandya, in Spl. Case No. 37/91 tried the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13 (1) (d) r/w S. 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, (for short 'the Act' ). After analysing the evidence adduced by the prosecution by examining P. Ws. 1 to 8; marked Exs. P-1 to P-14 and M. Os. 1 to 9 and also the evidence of the appellant as D. W. 1 has come to the conclusion that the appellant has committed the offence which was established by the prosecution beyond all reasonable doubt and after hearing both the parties, sentenced the appellant to undergo S. I. for a period of 6 months and to pay a fine of Rs. 200/- in default of payment of fine to undergo S. I. for a further period of 20 days for the offence punishable under S. 7 and also sentenced to undergo S. I. for a period of one year and pay a fine of Rs. 200/- in default to undergo S. I. for a further period of 20 days for the offence punishable under S. 13 (2) of the Act which is assailed in this appeal by the appellant accused.

(2.) HEARD both sides.

(3.) SRI A. H. Bhagavan the learned counsel for appellant at the very outset raised the contention that the sanction accorded as per Ex. P-14 is not issued by a competent person and there is no application of mind. Therefore, the appeal deserves to be allowed on that ground itself. In support of that argument, he also placed reliance on the Judgment of this Court in H. Munianjanappa v. State, (Crl. P. 2546/199) dt. 31-3-97 wherein this Court has held that the Under-Secretary to the Government of Karnataka is not a competent authority to issue sanction order and on that ground itself the criminal petition was allowed and the proceedings were quashed. He also placed reliance on a Judgment of this Court in J. S. Sathyanarayana (Deceased) by L. Rs. v. State by Inspector of Police, Karnataka Lokayukta, Madikeri, (2000) 5 Kant LJ 17 wherein this Court has held that existence of valid sanction is pre-requisite or condition precedent for the prosecution. . . . . . . it necessarily follows that if the sanction order is held to be bad in law that it will vitiate the entire proceeding. The consequences of quashing of the sanction order would be that the entire proceeding is vitiated and it necessarily follows therefore that the convictions and sentences recorded against the two appellants who were the two accused before the trial Court will necessarily have to be set aside.