LAWS(KAR)-2003-9-7

BASAVARAJEGOWDA Vs. MAHATMA GANDHI VIDHYA PEETA TRUST

Decided On September 11, 2003
BASAVARAJEGOWDA Appellant
V/S
MAHATMA GANDHI VIDYA PEETA TRUSTSDAYANANDA SAGAR INSTITUTIONS, BANGALORE Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS civil revision petition was listed for hearing along with C. R. P. No. 1681 of 2003. The reason for this was because the Education Appellate Tribunal has passed an order to the effect that the appeal filed to that forum is not maintainable in view of the existing position in law, the sequitur being that the petitioner would have to agitate his grievance under Section 131 of the Karnataka Education Act, 1983 before the revisional authority namely, the Secretary, Education of the State Government. It is also relevant for me to mention the brief facts insofar as the petitioner who was an employee of the institution is alleged to have submitted a letter of resignation dated 22-12-2000 which was accepted by the management on the same day and consequently, effect has been given to that resignation. The case of the -petitioner-employee is that even though the letter in question bears his handwriting and signature that it was extorted from him under very unfair circumstances and that therefore it has no effect in law. That position is contested by the management and the forum enquiring into the dispute will undoubtedly have to decide on the validity or otherwise of the letter dated 22-12-2000. The short question before this Court is as to whether the Tribunal was justified in having refused to exercise jurisdiction particularly, as pointed out by the petitioner's learned Advocate after some amount of evidence had been recorded and the case was effectively part-heard. The answer to that objection is that if a forum has no jurisdiction in law, it is always desirable that this be decided at the preliminary stage but even if a proceeding has made some headway that it is still eminently desirable that the jurisdiction issue be decided as early as possible and that even if a case is part-heard and this point is raised that the forum decides the issue at that stage itself. The obvious reason for this is because jurisdiction is something that goes to the very root or genesis of the exercise of power and a forum that is bereft of jurisdiction would be virtually wasting its time hearing a proceeding and deciding it became howsoever good the order is, it would still be bad in law and liable to be set aside on this ground alone. Therefore, the Tribunal was probably justified in having decided the issue at the point of time when it was raised. Petitioner's learned Advocate submits that if he was to be redirected to another forum that the authority should have done it right in the very beginning because several difficulties would arise, the first being limitation, the second being the fact that considerable time, energy and expenditure had been incurred until the present stage of the proceeding and that the petitioner will have to start from square 1 which is unfair. These submissions are perfectly valid and justified and more so in service matters where time and expenditure are of immense and paramount consequence. Under these circumstances, the correct position in law would be that if the petitioner is to be redirected to another forum that the existing record be transferred there so that the question of limitation would not come up and secondly, whatever headway the parties have made by way of pleadings, evidence recorded etc. , is saved. This would equally benefit both the parties and to my mind, is very necessary in the interest of justice. It is also a salutary principle which all Courts and forums would be advised to follow in situations of the present type because otherwise, it only leads to avoidable loss of judicial time and considerable amount of hardship to the litigating parties.

(2.) ON the basic question as to whether the Tribunal was right in the facts and circumstances of the present case in having refused to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this case would definitely not fall within the ambit of Section 94 of the Act, the petitioner's learned Advocate advanced a very interesting and to my mind, reasonably valid submission. His contention is that right from the beginning, the petitioner had contended that the resignation letter is not only unfair and illegal but he also contended that this document is of no consequence and that it cannot be used against him. His submission was that this Court will have to record aprima facie finding with regard to the true nature of the action and he adverted to the large number of judicial decisions wherein the Courts have not gone by the nomenclature attached to the action, have held that the real implications and true character of the action will have to be construed even for purposes of deciding as to which forum should entertain the appeal or revision against that application. There is considerable substance in this contention but I need to point out that the respondents' learned Counsel has perhaps justifiably brought it to my notice that the management has acted on the basis of the resignation letter and he maintains that the management stands by this position. Consequently, the situation that arises is that the petitioner will first have to demonstrate either through evidence on facts or on the basis of the legal position that the letter of resignation dated 22-12-2000 which again happens to be in his handwriting and bears the signature is of no consequence or that it cannot be used against him and will have to be ignored. The sequitur to this situation is that unless and until the petitioner is successful in overcoming that hurdle for purposes of classification this case will have to be treated as a resignation case. It may be that the petitioner challenges the resignation and it may be that ultimately he may succeed or fail in the challenge but as of today, where the validity or otherwise of that document is seriously contested and where evidence will have to be looked at which may include oral evidence, it would not be possible for this Court to even record a prima facie finding that the case comes within the ambit of the three categories indicated in section 94. It is true that the petitioner's learned Counsel submitted that if the petitioner succeeds in demolishing the resignation letter that the action will have to be construed as nothing short of a dismissal but in order to record that finding, as already indicated by me, petitioner will have to first demolish the letter dated 22-12-2000.

(3.) ONCE this position is reached, on the facts of the present case it would be very clear that Section 94 of the Act would not be applicable. Undoubtedly, the petitioner has challenged the action and therefore the challenge would have to be heard and adjudicated upon by the authority contemplated under Section 131. To my mind, that section would clearly apply because this is in the nature of an administrative action and the designated authority would therefore be competent to hear and decide the dispute. Petitioner's learned Advocate has raised one more point in this regard because he points out that as Section 131 is worded, the respondents would probably contend that a decision will have to be taken only on an examination of the record and that the authority will have no jurisdiction to entertain oral or documentary evidence. To my mind, Section 131 which requires an adjudication of the dispute cannot be read to exclude a reception of oral and documentary evidence and consequently that apprehension on the part of the petitioner will have to be set at rest by clarifying that the authority will have to entertain both oral and documentary evidence as produced by the parties, as on the facts of the present case, a correct legal adjudication cannot be arrived at without following this procedure.