(1.) This petition under Section 115, Civil P. C. has been brought up before us by way of a reference made by a learned Single Judge of this Court. It is by a tenant and is directed against an order made by the Principal Munsiff, Gadag in Misc. Case 1 of 1970.
(2.) The few relevant facts are as follows:-- The respondent herein, who is the owner of R. S. No, 332/2 in Huilgol Village, sued the petitioner herein, by an application filed before the Land Tribunal, constituted under the Mysore Land Reforms Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for a declaration that the petitioner was not a tenant. The said petition has been filed on 24-12-1966 under Section 112 of the Act. Since the application of the respondent had been filed beyond the time specified under the proviso to Section 4 of the Act, an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 1963, for condonation of delay involved in its presentation, was also filed. According to the proviso to Section 4 of the Act such an application ought to have been filed within one year from the appointed day, namely 2-10-1965, the date on which the Act came into force. On behalf of the petitioner herein, it was pleaded, inter alia, that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act would not be applicable to proceedings before a Tribunal under the Act and therefore, the application in question ought to be dismissed as not having been made in time. The learned Munsiff came to the conclusion, that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act were applicable to the case and posted the case for further hearing on other points arising therein. Hence this petition.
(3.) On behalf of the petitioner, Sri M. Rama Bhat, the learned counsel urged a two-fold contention. It is : the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act would be inapplicable to the present proceeding as the Tribunal was not a Court and there was nothing in the Act which makes them expressly applicable to such a proceeding; and the provisions of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act cannot also be of any assistance, as the time limit specified in the proviso to Section 4 of the Act is not a period of limitation prescribed for the filing of applications as the one in question. On behalf of the respondent, Sri R. U. Goulay, learned counsel depending principally on the provisions of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act contended that the Act being a special law and there being no words expressly providing for the exclusion from operation of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, in the 'Act' itself, the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act would be applicable to the proceedings in question.