(1.) The suit out of which this appeal arises was filed by the first respondent for redemption of the properties now in dispute. According to his case the property belonged to his father Venkataramanayya and his uncle Ranganna and they mortgaged the properties witli possession to Siddabasappa father of Defendants 1 and 2. The 3rd defendant has been impleaded as a person in possession of the properties, while plaintiff's brothers defendants 4 and 5 are formal parties to the suit. The main contesting defendant is the third defendant. He claims to have been in adverse possession of the property for over 12 years and denies title of the plaintiff. He does not admit that the property had been mortgaged by his father and uncle as alleged in the plaint.
(2.) Some oral evidence has been let in by the plaintiff to show that the mortgage deed, copy of which is Ext. J, is genuine and that the properties are his family properties and that they were in possession of the mortgagee Siddabasappa. P. W. 2 an old man of 80 at the time of his examination in 1947, was a young man of 25 years on the date of the original of Exhibit J. He says that he was present at the time Ranganna, plaintiff's uncle presented the document for registration and admitted its execution both on his behalf and on behalf of his brother Venkataramanayya. Exhibit B is the original of power of attorney under which Venkataramanayya had authorised Ranganna to admit execution before the Sub-Registrar not only of the original of Exhibit J but also of Exhibit E and two other documents. It must also be noted that the handwriting of Subbannachar in Ext. B has been spoken to by this witness. Exhibit E which purports to have been executed in favour of the grand-father of P. W. 2 was also registered on the day on which the original of Exhibit J was registered. All this probabilises the evidence of P. W. 2. Apart from the evidence of this witness, it must be stated that the mortgage deed of which Ext. J is a copy, is a registered document which came into existence about CO years ago and neither the attestors nor the writer are alive and the parties to the documents are also dead. It is particularly in cases of this kind that the presumption that arises under Section 60 of the Registration Act should be raised. A presumption arises under Section 114 of the Evidence Act. As has been observed by this Court in 'Hutche Gowda v. Chennige Gowda', S. A. No. 8 of 1948-49 (Mys.):
(3.) The lower appellate Court was therefore right in holding that the mortgage deed, copy of which is Exhibit J is a genuine document.